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ABSTRACT 
Of all the controversial presidential actions during President 
Trump’s first three years in office, few challenged the norms of 
presidential behavior more than his constant barrage of attacks on his 
own Department of Justice. President Trump violated traditional norms 
governing the relationship between the White House and the Department 
of Justice in two distinct ways. First, on Twitter and in other public 
statements, he repeatedly called upon the Department to investigate 
political opponents. Second, the President repeatedly attacked the 
Department’s investigation of Russian interference with the 2016 
presidential election (“the Mueller investigation”) and other 
investigations relating to the misconduct of the President and his 
associates. White House interference in cases where the President has a 
personal or political stake raises obvious conflict-of-interest problems 
that threaten the impartiality of the criminal justice system. Not since 
Richard Nixon has a president been so heedless of these potential 
conflicts of interest. President Trump’s efforts to influence individual 
investigations raised serious concerns within and outside of the 
Department of Justice. 
Thus far, the academic treatments of President Trump’s DOJ 
interactions have focused solely on the rules that have traditionally 
governed the relationship between the White House and the Department 
of Justice. These articles have made persuasive cases that President 
Trump’s actions violate these informal norms and constitutionally based 
policies. Although the President properly must be concerned with the 
general policies that govern the allocation of prosecutorial resources and 
the focus of government law enforcement at the Department of Justice, it 
is a different matter when the White House becomes involved with 
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individual investigations and prosecutions. White House influence over 
individual cases creates at least the appearance of improper political 
influence designed to punish opponents and shield the friends of the 
incumbent President.  
The case against White House involvement in individual cases 
becomes much stronger, however, when placed in the context of 
constitutional limitations on the involvement of both the judicial and 
legislative branches in individual prosecutorial decision making. These 
rules prevent federal judges and the Congress from ordering federal 
prosecutors to initiate criminal cases or investigations. Moreover, the 
rules are sufficiently strict to prevent the other branches from influencing 
prosecutorial decisions through indirect methods such as congressional 
oversight of open criminal investigations.  
The constitutional rules governing federal prosecutorial 
independence derive from the fundamental constitutional principle that 
all three branches must act independently before the federal government 
may punish someone for violating federal criminal law. Congress must 
act by passing a criminal statute of general applicability; the executive 
branch must independently investigate potential violations of that law 
and select individuals for prosecution; and the federal courts must 
determine individual guilt in a trial where the right to a jury is 
guaranteed. Thus, judicial and legislative involvement in individual 
prosecutorial decisions is constitutionally forbidden not because the 
involvement infringes on the President’s authority, but rather because 
such involvement would impermissibly aggrandize the other branches 
by giving them power over more than one stage of the three-stage federal 
criminal justice process.  
These constitutional restrictions on judicial and legislative 
involvement in prosecutorial decisions strongly reinforce the case for 
prosecutorial independence from White House involvement in 
individual cases and investigations. The integrity of the process depends 
upon prosecutorial decisions that are free from political influence and 
based solely on the merits of the individual case. Each branch must play 
its part independently of the others, and the role of the executive branch 
is compromised if political influence taints the process of independent 
prosecutorial decision-making.  
How then might we might respond to these challenges to federal 
prosecutorial independence? The first response is conceptual. We can 
reinforce the norm of prosecutorial independence within the executive 
branch by placing it in the context of the separation-of-powers principles 
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that mandate prosecutorial independence from the judicial and 
legislative branches. These principles explain why the norm of 
prosecutorial independence from the White House in individual cases is 
so important. Second, Congress has several informal mechanisms to 
strengthen and preserve this norm, including oversight hearings and the 
Senatorial confirmation process. Third, we should consider potential 
statutory or regulatory changes that would protect prosecutorial 
independence in individual cases while respecting the President’s 
constitutional power to direct the general policies and management of 
the Department of Justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of all the controversial presidential actions during President 
Trump’s first three years in office, few challenged the norms of 
presidential behavior more than his constant barrage of attacks on his 
own Department of Justice.1 President Trump violated traditional 
norms governing the relationship between the White House and the 
Department of Justice in two distinct ways. First, on Twitter and in other 
public statements, he repeatedly called upon the Department to 
investigate political opponents.2 Second, the President repeatedly 
attacked the Department’s investigation of Russian interference with 
the 2016 presidential election (“the Mueller investigation”) and other 
 
 1. For a thorough discussion of the significance of President Trump’s actions towards the 
Department of Justice, see generally Bruce Green and Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President 
Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018); Andrew Kent, Congress and the 
Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927 (2018); Daphna Renan, 
Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018); Andrew McCanse Wright, The 
Take Care Clause, Justice Department Independence, and White House Control, 121 W. VA. L. 
REV. 355 (2018); Mark Mazzetti et al., Intimidation, Pressure and Humiliation: Inside Trump’s 
Two-Year War on the Investigations Encircling Him, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/trump-investigations.html; No “Absolute Right” 
to Control DOJ: Constitutional Limits on White House Interference with Law Enforcement 
Matters, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (2018), https://protectdemocracy.org/resource-library/document 
/no-absolute-right-control-doj/.  
 2. See Mazzetti, supra note 1 (describing how the President encouraged House Republicans 
to conduct oversight hearings regarding Hillary Clinton and members of the FBI); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 273–283. 
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investigations relating to the misconduct of the President and his 
associates.3 White House interference in cases where the President has 
a personal or political stake raises obvious conflict-of-interest problems 
that threaten the impartiality of the criminal justice system. Not since 
Richard Nixon has a president been so heedless of these potential 
conflicts of interest.4 President Trump’s efforts to influence individual 
investigations raised serious concerns within and outside of the 
Department of Justice.5 
Concern over these issues intensified after the release of the 
Mueller Report (“the Report”).6 In particular, Volume II of the Report 
recounts 10 instances of obstruction of justice by President Trump, each 
of which, at the very least, constitutes an unprecedented interference 
with the work of the Department of Justice in ongoing investigations.7 
Whether the Report establishes a case for criminal obstruction of 
justice is the subject of an ongoing intense debate.8 Even if the 
President’s actions do not amount to conduct that could be prosecuted 
as obstruction of justice, they raise grave concerns about politically 
motivated White House influence over open criminal investigations. 
Thus far, the academic treatment of President Trump’s DOJ 
interactions has focused solely on the rules that have traditionally 
governed the relationship between the White House and the 
 
 3. See Mazzetti, supra note 1 (detailing how the President used Twitter to call the Mueller 
investigation a “witch hunt” and undermine potential witnesses to the investigation).  
 4. See Green and Roiphe, supra note 1, at 3 (referencing President Nixon’s “Saturday Night 
Massacre” in his attempt to stop the Special Counsel investigation). 
 5. See Mazzetti, supra note 1. 
 6. United States Department of Justice, Report on the Investigation into Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III (2019) 
[hereinafter Mueller Report]. The version released by the Department of Justice in May of 2019 
was redacted to protect grand jury material and information that could reveal investigative 
sources and methods or cause harm to ongoing investigations. 
 7. See id. at Volume II, 15–158 (describing potential instances of obstruction of justice). 
 8. See Read: Attorney General Barr’s Letter on the Mueller Report’s Principal Conclusions, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-attorney-
general-barr-s-principal-conclusions-of-the-mueller-report/218b8095-c5e3-4eab-9135-4170f5b3e 
87f/ (Attorney General Barr summarizing the findings of the Mueller Report and said: “I have 
concluded that the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is not sufficient 
to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense.”); see contra Rachael 
Bade, et al., Democrats Close in on Citing Barr for Contempt, WASH. POST (May 7, 2019, 
2:59AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-would-have-been-
charged-with-obstruction-were-he-not-president-hundreds-of-former-federal-prosecutors-assert  
/2019/05/06/e4 946a1a-7006-11e9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a_story.html (“More than 450 former federal 
prosecutors who worked in Republican and Democratic administrations have signed on to a 
statement asserting special counsel Robert S. Mueller III’s findings would have produced 
obstruction charges against President Trump—if not for the office he holds.”). 
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Department of Justice.9 These articles have made persuasive cases that 
President Trump’s actions violate these informal norms and 
constitutionally based policies. 
Although President Trump properly must be concerned with the 
general policies that govern the allocation of prosecutorial resources 
and the focus of government law enforcement at the Department of 
Justice, it is a different matter when the White House becomes involved 
with individual investigations and prosecutions. At the very least, White 
House influence over individual cases creates the appearance of 
improper political influence designed to punish opponents and shield 
the friends of the incumbent President. The problem of White House 
involvement in open cases becomes much stronger, however, when 
placed in the context of constitutional limitations on the involvement 
of both the judicial and legislative branches in individual prosecutorial 
decision making. These rules prevent federal judges and Congress from 
ordering federal prosecutors to initiate criminal cases or investigations. 
Moreover, the rules are sufficiently strict to prevent the other branches 
from influencing prosecutorial decisions through indirect methods, 
such as congressional oversight of open criminal investigations.10 
The constitutional rules governing federal prosecutorial 
independence derive from the fundamental constitutional principle 
that all three branches must act independently before the United States 
government may punish someone for violating federal criminal law. 
Congress must act by passing a criminal statute of general applicability; 
the executive branch must independently investigate potential 
violations of that law and select individuals for prosecution; and the 
federal courts must determine individual guilt in a trial where the right 
to a jury is guaranteed. Thus, judicial and legislative involvement in 
individual prosecutorial decisions is constitutionally forbidden not only 
because the involvement infringes on the President’s authority, but also 
because such involvement would impermissibly aggrandize the other 
branches by giving them power over more than one stage of the three-
stage federal criminal justice process. 
These constitutional restrictions on judicial and legislative 
involvement in prosecutorial decisions strongly reinforce the case for 
prosecutorial independence from White House involvement in 
 
 9. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 1; Wright, supra note 1. 
 10. Todd David Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigations, 77 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373, 1437–38 (2002) [hereinafter Peterson, Congressional Oversight]. 
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individual cases and investigations. This does not mean that the 
Constitution prohibits such White House interference; rather, it means 
that politically motivated White House involvement in individual 
prosecutions is a serious abuse of presidential power. 
This article analyzes these issues in four parts. Part I describes the 
role of each branch in the criminal justice process. Part II examines the 
independence of federal prosecutors from the judicial branch. Part III 
assesses the parallel constitutional restrictions on the legislative 
branch, which prevent Congress from ordering the initiation or closure 
of criminal investigations or cases.11 Part IV shifts to the executive 
branch to analyze the traditional constraints on White House 
involvement in individual cases.12 Part V discusses some normative 
conclusions about federal prosecutorial independence.13 
This final section considers responses to the challenges to federal 
prosecutorial independence.14 The first response is conceptual. We can 
reinforce the norm of prosecutorial independence within the executive 
branch by placing it in the context of the separation-of-powers 
principles that mandate prosecutorial independence from the judicial 
and legislative branches. These principles explain why prosecutorial 
independence from the White House in individual cases is so 
important. Second, Congress has several informal mechanisms that 
strengthen and preserve this norm, including oversight hearings and the 
Senate confirmation process. Third, we should consider potential 
statutory or regulatory changes that would protect prosecutorial 
independence in individual cases while respecting the President’s 
constitutional power to direct the general policies and management of 
the Department of Justice. 
I. THE ROLE OF EACH OF THE BRANCHES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS 
All three branches play an important and distinct role before a 
person is incarcerated for a crime.15 The legislature must pass a law of 
 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV.  
 13. See infra Part V.  
 14. See id. 
 15. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“The constitutional scheme is as simple as it is complete–
Congress passes the criminal law in the first instance, the President enforces the law, and 
individual cases are tried before a neutral judiciary involved in neither the creation nor the 
execution of that law.”). In Morrison, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
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general applicability that defines certain types of activities as criminal. 
The executive must designate a particular individual as deserving of 
prosecution under applicable standards of prosecutorial discretion. 
Finally, the judiciary must pass upon the guilt or innocence of that 
specific individual. The separation of these functions into three 
separate branches helps to ensure that no person is subjected to the 
ultimate coercive power of the state on the basis of the actions of only 
one or two branches of the federal government. This distribution and 
separation of the powers serves as an important protection against 
arbitrary punishment.16 Each branch has the exclusive authority over 
its constitutionally given power that precludes the other two branches 
from exercising those same powers. 
When it comes to the executive branch in particular, its power is 
limited to making the decision of whether to prosecute.17 As John 
Marshall stated when he was a member of Congress, the executive 
branch may “direct that the criminal be prosecuted no further. This is . . . 
the exercise of an indubitable and a constitutional power.”18 The Office 
of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) summed up the principle thusly: “The 
Executive’s exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the law gives 
rise to the corollary that neither the Judicial nor Legislative Branches 
may directly interfere with the prosecutorial discretion of the 
Executive by directing the Executive Branch to prosecute particular 
individuals.”19 In reviewing the basis for this principle, this article pays 
attention to the reasons behind the limitations on judicial and 
legislative power to inform the reader’s understanding of federal 
prosecutorial independence within the executive branch. 
 
holding that the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act were 
unconstitutional, see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60, 697, but did not disapprove the above-cited 
principle. 
 16. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 488 (“The Constitution therefore carefully distributes 
the various responsibilities for criminal prosecution among each of the three branches, so that 
citizens may not be endangered by one branch acting alone.”).  
 17. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
 18. Congressman John Marshall, Speech to the House of Representatives (1800), reprinted 
in 18 U.S. app. at 29 (1820) (cited in Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 263). 
 19. Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted 
a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101, 115 (1984), 1984 WL 178358 
[hereinafter Olson Memorandum].  
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II. FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH 
The judicial branch has a limited and specific role to play in the 
criminal justice process. The courts may act to determine individual 
guilt or innocence only after Congress declares that certain conduct is 
subject to criminal sanctions and the executive branch independently 
determines who should be prosecuted for criminal violations. The 
different doctrines that reflect this constitutional principle are 
discussed below. 
A. The Prohibition Against Judicially Created Crimes 
During the first two decades after the ratification of the 
Constitution, there was considerable controversy over whether federal 
courts had inherited the traditional English common law power to 
recognize and punish crimes as a matter of common law without 
statutory warrant.20 Prior to 1812, at least eight federal circuit court 
cases had recognized federal common law crimes.21 Moreover, the issue 
split the dominant parties of the 1790s, with the Federalists generally 
supporting the legitimacy of federal common law crimes and the 
Jeffersonians opposing it.22 By the time the issue reached the Court, 
however, this debate had been decisively resolved against the 
constitutionality of federal common law crimes.23 
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin24 delivered the death blow. 
The case involved an indictment for criminal libel about the President 
and Congress published in a Connecticut newspaper.25 Although there 
was no statute making libel a criminal offense, it was recognized as a 
crime at common law. If the federal courts possessed all the common-
law powers of their English forbears, it would have been well within the 
Court’s authority to punish the alleged offense. Instead, the Court 
unanimously recognized the incompatibility of English common-law 
power with the constitutionally mandated separation of powers in the 
context of criminal prosecutions.26 The Court held: 
 
 20. Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The 
Jeffersonian Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 
924 (1992). 
 21. See id. at 920 n.8 (citing relevant cases). 
 22. Id. at 922. 
 23. Id. at 922–23.  
 24. 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
 25. Rowe, supra note 20, at 924.  
 26. Id. at 922 (“[The abolition of common law crimes] crystallized the realization . . . that the 
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If it may communicate certain implied powers to the general 
Government, it would not follow that the Courts of that 
Government are vested with jurisdiction over any particular act 
done by an individual in supposed violation of the peace and dignity 
of the sovereign power. The legislative authority of the Union must 
first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the 
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.27 
This decision established a firm principle that separated the roles of 
Congress and the courts with respect to criminal prosecutions. The 
courts adjudicate individual guilt or innocence once a case has been 
brought before them, but they play no role in determining the generally 
applicable rules governing what types of conduct may be subject to 
criminal prosecution, as Congress has the exclusive authority to make 
such rules through the legislative process. 
B. The Prohibition Against Judicially Mandated Prosecutions 
The constitutional prohibition against judicial involvement in the 
creation of federal crimes extends equally to the selection of 
individuals for prosecution. The principle that courts will not step in to 
order the prosecution of a particular individual is not merely a 
common-law doctrine; it is rooted in the constitutional separation of 
powers. For example, in United States v. Nixon28 the Court announced 
in sweeping dictum that “the executive branch has exclusive authority 
and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”29 The 
Court has acknowledged this principle on many other occasions.30 
Moreover, the Court has recognized the authority of the Attorney 
General to be the exclusive representative of the United States in 
litigation.31 
 
Constitution and the common law could not coexist, that the American system of government 
had broken off from its English antecedents more sharply than anyone had quite realized.”).  
 27. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. at 34. However, the Court recognized that a court has the 
inherent power to impose sanctions for contempt of court. This power is discussed at greater 
length. See infra text accompanying notes 54–61. 
 28. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 29. Id. at 693. 
 30. For example, in Heckler v. Chaney, the Court stated, in relation to sanctioning the FDA’s 
discretion to not commence an enforcement action against a drug manufacturer in evaluating the 
use of lethal injection as a method of capital punishment, that “[a]n agency’s refusal to institute 
proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the 
Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special province 
of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 3) 
 31. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 282–85 (1888); The Confiscation 
PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  11:55 AM 
2020] FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE 227 
The lower courts have expressly recognized this constitutional 
limitation on their power as well. For example, in Pugach v. Klein,32 a 
district court refused to order a United States Attorney to prosecute an 
individual for a violation of federal wiretap laws.33 The court asserted 
that it was without the power to make such an order because it was 
clear beyond question that it is not the business of the Courts to tell 
the United States Attorney to perform what they conceive to be his 
duties. Article II, § 3 of the Constitution provides that “[the 
President] shall take Care that the Laws [shall] be faithfully 
executed.” The prerogative of enforcing the criminal law was vested 
by the Constitution, therefore, not in the Courts, nor in private 
citizens, but squarely in the executive arm of the government.34 
This constitutional division of authority rests on two principles: a 
non-interference principle, which prevents the judicial and legislative 
branches from second-guessing decisions that can be made more 
effectively by the executive branch; and a non-aggrandizement 
principle, which prevents other branches from abusing their authority 
by adding prosecutorial power to the other powers they exercise.35 
The non-interference principle is founded on the idea that federal 
prosecutors are empowered to consider a wide range of factors in 
determining whom to prosecute. The Supreme Court discussed these 
multiple factors in Wayte v. United States,36 a case dealing with the issue 
of selective prosecution: 
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the 
decision to prosecute is particularly ill suited to judicial review. Such 
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general 
deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the 
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan 
are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are 
competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, 
entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of 
a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law 
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decision-
making to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial 
 
Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1869); The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. 370, 371 (1866).  
 32. 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
 33. Id. at 635 
 34. Id. at 634. 
 35. Todd David Peterson, Procedural Checks: How the Constitution (And Congress) Control 
the Power of the Three Branches, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 211, 221 (2017) [hereinafter 
Peterson, Procedural Checks]. 
 36. 470 U.S. 598 (1985). 
PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  11:55 AM 
228 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15 
effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy. 
All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly 
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.37 
Thus, because the executive branch is uniquely competent to take 
account of these many permissible factors, the other branches are 
prohibited from interfering with decisions not to prosecute. 
Prosecutorial discretion at the federal level, however, is about more 
than just respect for the authority of the executive branch; it is an 
integral part of the separation of powers created by the Constitution to 
protect citizens’ rights by limiting the power of the branches to abuse 
their authority. Thus, the focus is not just on the extent to which 
executive branch power may be limited or circumscribed, but rather on 
the extent to which the authority of the judiciary may be enlarged to 
include a power that may be reserved solely to the executive branch. 
This distinction is more than a semantic one. It reflects a genuine 
difference with respect to the policies of the constitutionally mandated 
separation of powers: the need to avoid a concentration of powers that 
can lead to the deprivation of individual rights. 
This constitutional principle was the foundation for the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cox,38 the leading circuit court case 
on the scope of federal prosecutorial discretion. In Cox, the court 
overturned a district court order that required a United States 
Attorney to prepare and sign an indictment returned by a grand jury. 
The court noted that “[t]he Attorney General is the hand of the 
President in taking care that the laws of the United States in legal 
proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses be faithfully executed” 
and “as an incident of the constitutional powers, . . . the courts are not 
to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the 
attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal 
prosecutions.”39 
Even the three dissenting judges in Cox conceded that although 
they believed that the United States Attorney could be required to sign 
the indictment, “once the indictment is returned, the Attorney General 
 
 37. Id. at 607–08; accord Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987); see James 
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1540–42 (1981) 
(discussing how the Supreme Court has largely upheld the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
except in the rare cases where prosecutions are initiated based on race, sex, religion, or the 
exercise of free speech rights or motivated by personal animus or retaliation).  
 38. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). 
 39. Id. at 171. 
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or the United States Attorney can refuse to go forward.”40 Cox clearly 
links the discretion not to prosecute a particular individual with the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers.41 
Many other lower courts have cited Cox with approval and 
followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead.42 For example, the Second Circuit 
stated: 
The relevance of Cox to our opinion is not in its teaching that 
indictments require consent of the government attorney. More 
pertinent is Cox’s telling statement about the nature of the checks 
and balances inherent in our legal system. Not only must the 
prosecutor wait for the grand jury’s determination before he or she 
may proceed in a felony case, but the grand jury may not issue an 
indictment where the prosecutor is opposed. Moreover, the court 
lacks the power to compel the prosecutor to proceed over his 
objection. Viewed in this light, the federal grand jury system reflects 
the structure of our constitutional scheme, requiring, for proper 
resolution, diffusion of power and the existence of checks and 
balances.43 
By emphasizing the “diffusion of power” and the existence of “checks 
and balances,” the Court made clear that prosecutorial discretion is not 
just a matter of protecting executive power, but also about protecting 
individual rights by ensuring that each branch is an independent 
 
 40. Id. at 179 (Rives, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 41. Cox did not, however, shield the entire prosecutorial process from judicial supervision. 
A majority of the court (composed of the three dissenting judges and one concurring judge) took 
the view that the United States Attorney could be required to prepare an indictment for use by 
the grand jury. See id. at 177–81 (Rives, Gewin, & Bell, JJ. concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 182–85 (Brown, J., concurring). In addition, the district court in In re Grand Jury, 315 
F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970), held that although a United States Attorney could not be required to 
sign an indictment and forced to proceed with a prosecution, in a case in which the grand jury 
wished to indict, “the substance of the charges in the indictment should be disclosed, omitting 
certain portions as to which the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, concludes that the public 
interest in disclosure is outweighed by the private prejudice to the persons involved, none of 
whom are charged with any crime in the proposed indictment.” Id. at 678–79. Thus, at least under 
this view, the United States Attorney might be required to prepare and publish an indictment 
under certain circumstances, although the court could not require him to proceed with a 
prosecution. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Easton, 937 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1991); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1117–18 (2nd 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Hammer, Criminal Action No. 4:96–CR–0239, 2014 WL 2465276, at 
*17 (M.D. Pa. May 29, 2014); United States v. Slone, 969 F. Supp. 2d 830, 837 (E.D. Ky. 2013); In 
re Mayer, No. 05–33 (SRC), 2006 WL 20526, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2006); United States v. Chi 
Keung Chim, 708 F. Supp. 38, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 43. Soloff, 920 F.2d at 1118. 
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decision-maker within its assigned area of the criminal prosecution 
process. 
Then-Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh stated the reasons for 
requiring independent prosecutorial decision-making even more 
clearly: 
The Executive’s broad prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers 
illustrate a key point of the Constitution’s separation of powers. One 
of the greatest unilateral powers a President possesses under the 
Constitution, at least in the domestic sphere, is the power to protect 
individual liberty by essentially under-enforcing federal statutes 
regulating private behavior—more precisely, the power either not 
to seek charges against violators of a federal law or to pardon 
violators of a federal law. The Framers saw the separation of the 
power to prosecute from the power to legislate as essential to 
preserving individual liberty . . . . After enacting a statute, Congress 
may not mandate the prosecution of violators of that statute. 
Instead, the President’s prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers 
operate as an independent protection for individual citizens against 
the enforcement of oppressive laws that Congress may have passed 
(and still further protection comes from later review by an 
independent jury and Judiciary in those prosecutions brought by the 
Executive).44 
Judge Kavanaugh understood that prosecutorial discretion limits the 
judiciary’s power to order prosecution of a particular individual on the 
basis of a statute that mandates universal prosecution. The courts may 
not aggrandize their authority by assuming prosecutorial functions that 
have constitutionally been assigned to the executive branch. 
Other courts concur that prosecution is a purely executive function 
that may not be exercised by the courts.45 In no case has any court ever 
 
 44. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). 
 45. Indeed, the courts have occasionally expounded at some length on this constitutional 
principle, even when it might not have been entirely necessary. For example, in Smith v. United 
States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967), the court of appeals upheld 
the dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act suit against the United States for failure to prosecute 
individuals whom the plaintiff alleged were interfering with and injuring the plaintiff’s business. 
Id. at 244. In holding that the prosecutor’s decision not to bring a criminal case was protected by 
the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, the Court held: “The President [of] the United 
States is charged in Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution with the duty to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .’” Id. at 246. “The Attorney General is the President’s surrogate 
in the prosecution in all offenses against the United States. The discretion of the Attorney 
General in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution 
already started, is absolute . . . . This discretion is required in all cases.” Id. at 246–47; see also 
Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463, 464–65 (7th Cir. 1955) (granting a U.S. Attorney’s motion to 
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directly ordered the executive branch to commence a prosecution.46 
Thus, case law supports the general proposition that the executive 
alone may make the prosecutorial decision to bring a criminal case and 
that the courts may not override that decision. 
C. Judicial Exceptions to the Executive’s Exclusive Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
Notwithstanding the above doctrine, the executive does not have 
absolute control over all prosecutorial decisions. First, there are certain 
judicially recognized exceptions to the absolute authority of a 
prosecutor which have allowed courts to challenge prosecutorial 
inaction and review a prosecutor’s decision to dismiss a case that has 
already been brought. Second, the Supreme Court has permitted trial 
courts to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt of court in 
situations where parties have violated court orders. 
The courts have been empowered to restrict the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in certain limited instances. By and large, 
however, these instances involve the imposition of external restrictions 
on the unlimited freedom of the executive branch to make 
prosecutorial decisions rather than grants of authority to the judicial 
branch to initiate prosecutorial action. For example, the Supreme Court 
has suggested that there are constitutional restrictions against selective 
prosecution based on the exercise of a protected constitutional right.47 
As previously indicated, these cases do not pose significant separation 
of powers problems because they do not transfer executive power to 
another branch and thereby increase the concentration of authority in 
the coordinate branch. Instead, these cases simply recognize 
 
dismiss in a mandamus suit that sought to enjoin the prosecution of a particular criminal case 
because requiring the U.S. Attorney to do so was beyond the power of the court).  
 46. But see Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 794 (1987) 
(approving the appointment by a court of a special prosecutor to prosecute criminal contempt of 
court). 
 47. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (requiring that a party claiming a 
prosecutorial equal protection violation show “that the passive enforcement system had a 
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (finding no equal protection violation for the state prosecutor’s selective 
prosecution of a habitual offender statute because there was no allegation that there was selective 
enforcement based on “race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (recognizing an equal protection violation when a race-neutral law is 
administered in a discriminatory way); see also United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 600 (5th 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrios, 
501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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constitutional restraints upon the authority of the executive to take 
prosecutorial action.48 
Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure creates 
another potential limitation on prosecutorial discretion. The rule limits 
the power of the Attorney General or the United States Attorney to 
dismiss a prosecution in a case that has already been brought before 
the courts.49 In particular, a federal prosecutor may not dismiss a case 
simply by filing a nolle prosequi, only to prosecute the same case at a 
later date. 
Rule 48 was adopted principally “to protect a defendant against 
prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging 
when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the 
defendant’s objection.”50 The lower courts do not agree on the extent 
to which Rule 48(a) allows courts to refuse a request to dismiss an 
indictment, even with the defendant’s consent, and the Supreme Court 
has not yet resolved this issue.51 The courts seem to recognize, however, 
that the purpose of Rule 48(a) is to protect against prosecutorial 
 
 48. A slightly different problem is presented by decisions ordering the executive branch to 
enforce criminal statutes that were being generally ignored. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 
679–82 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) 
(en banc); N.A.A.C.P. v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109, 1115–17 (D.D.C. 1976). For example, in Nader, 
the plaintiffs challenged the general failure of the Department of Justice to bring any prosecutions 
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070 et seq., 2 U.S.C. former §§ 241–56, repealed 
by, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. 92–225, Title IV, § 405, Feb. 7, 1972, 86 
Stat. 20. The court of appeals, in upholding the lower court’s dismissal based on standing, 
indicated in dictum that “established precedents [do not] necessarily foreclose judicial review” of 
such non-prosecution policies suggesting they “lie outside the constitutional and statutory limits 
of ‘prosecutorial discretion.’” Nader, 497 F.2d at 679. The complaint did not ask the court to 
determine whether “a particular violator should be prosecuted” but, rather, review the 
Department’s total failure to enforce a criminal statute. Id. Thus, cases like Nader reaffirm, rather 
than weaken, the judicial reluctance to grant a prosecutorial power to a branch other than the 
executive. 
 49. FED. R. CRIM P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, 
information, or complaint. The government may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without 
the defendant’s consent.”).  
 50. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977); see also United States v. Hayden, 
860 F.2d 1483, 1487–89 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Abreu, 747 F. Supp. 493, 502 (N.D. Ind. 
1990) (citations omitted) (“The primary purpose of the Rule 48(a) requirement that leave of court 
be obtained before dismissing charges ‘is [the] protection of defendant’s rights . . . “to prevent 
harassment of a defendant by charging, dismissing, and re-charging without placing a defendant 
in jeopardy”.’” (internal citations omitted)).  
 51. United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Weber, 
721 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 632 (5th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 507–08 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United 
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  11:55 AM 
2020] FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE 233 
abuses, not to transfer prosecutorial power to the judicial branch. The 
Fifth Circuit has stated: 
The rule was not promulgated to shift absolute power from the 
Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a power 
to check power. The Executive remains the absolute judge of 
whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and 
presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution be 
terminated.52 
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has stated that the constitutionality of Rule 
48(a) is dependent upon the prosecutor’s discretion not to commence 
a case in the first place.53 Even in cases where courts have asserted some 
authority to deny leave to dismiss, they have doubted their 
constitutional power to order the executive to proceed with a 
prosecution. Judge Weinfeld concluded that if the government failed to 
proceed with a prosecution after refusal of leave to dismiss an 
indictment, the court “would be without power to issue mandamus or 
other order to compel prosecution of the indictment since a direction 
would invade the traditional separation of powers doctrine.”54 Thus, the 
case law interpreting Rule 48(a) also supports the proposition that 
federal prosecutors retain sole power to decide whom to prosecute. 
The only significant exception to the consistent refusal to allow 
federal courts to initiate prosecutions is contained in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et. Fils S.A.55 In 
Young, the Court considered whether federal trial courts have the 
inherent authority to initiate prosecutions for criminal contempt of 
court.56 The Court concluded that the courts have such power pursuant 
to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
provides for disposition of criminal contempt upon notice and 
hearing.57 The Court explained that the federal courts would be at the 
mercy of other branches if they were without the authority to initiate 
prosecutions for violations of their own injunctions: 
 
 52. Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513. 
 53. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171–72 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 
U.S. 935 (1965). 
 54. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt and Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 228 F. Supp. 
483, 489 (S.D.N.Y 1964); accord Cowan, 524 F.2d at 511 (“The result is that although the court is 
authorized to deny the motion to dismiss in the public interest, it is nevertheless constitutionally 
powerless to compel the government to proceed.”).  
 55. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
 56. Id. at 792.  
 57. Id. at 794.  
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The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as 
essential in ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its 
own authority without complete dependence on other branches. If 
a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have 
been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then 
are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly 
calls “the judicial power of the United States” would be a mere 
mockery. Courts cannot be at the mercy of another branch in 
deciding whether such proceedings should be initiated. The ability 
to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a contempt action 
satisfies the need for an independent means of self-protection, 
without which the courts would be mere boards of arbitration whose 
judgments and decrees would be only advisory.58 
The Court emphasized, however, that a prosecution for criminal 
contempt in this manner should be a measure of last resort, and the 
Court suggested that a court should consider the imposition of criminal 
contempt “only if the civil remedy is deemed inadequate.”59 In 
addition, the Court noted that a trial court ordinarily should first 
request the appropriate prosecuting authority to initiate the criminal 
contempt proceeding. Only when the prosecuting officials in the 
United States Attorney’s office fail to initiate criminal actions should a 
court appoint its own prosecutor.60 The Court underscored the need for 
judicial restraint because “the rationale for the appointment authority 
is necessity. If the Judiciary were completely dependent on the 
Executive Branch to redress direct affronts to its authority, it would be 
powerless to protect itself if that branch declined prosecution.”61 
 
 58. Id. at 796 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 59. Id. at 801. In a subsequent case, the Court upheld statutory restrictions on the authority 
of an independent prosecutor to file a petition for certiorari without approval by the Solicitor 
General. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 708 (1988). Thus, a contempt 
prosecution is subject to some control by the executive branch, at least at the Supreme Court 
level. 
 60. Young, 481 U.S. at 801–02. In a later case, the Court noted that “[u]nder the procedures 
set out in Young, it seems evident that the majority of contempt cases will be prosecuted by the 
United States Attorney.” Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 706. 
 61. Young, 481 U.S. at 801. Justice Scalia’s concurrence vigorously contested the majority’s 
conclusion that a court may appoint a prosecutor for a criminal contempt of court by attacking 
the assumption that the executive’s decision to decline to prosecute a contempt of court would 
render the judiciary impotent and thus improperly subject to executive branch control. To the 
contrary: 
[T]he ability of the executive branch to block a prosecution for criminal contempt of 
court is a carefully designed and critical element of our system of Government. There 
are numerous instances in which the Constitution leaves open the theoretical possibility 
that the actions of one Branch may be brought to naught by the actions or inactions of 
another. Such dispersion of power was central to the scheme of forming a Government 
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This exception for criminal contempt of court does not significantly 
diminish the general conclusion that judicial power cannot extend to 
the selection of individuals for prosecution. This is because Young did 
not hold that trial courts can require the executive to prosecute 
criminal contempt cases or that the courts have the power to enforce 
such a requirement.62 What is important to keep in mind is that the 
separation of powers rationale for restricting the power of selecting 
individuals for prosecution to the executive branch rests not only on 
the idea that the branch is better suited to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion, but also on the more fundamental principle that all three 
branches must exercise independent judgments before a person can be 
punished under federal criminal law. Young stands only for the limited 
proposition that the Constitution does not deprive courts of the 
traditional methods for enforcing compliance with their own orders. 
The general limitation on judicial initiation of prosecutions remains 
intact because, if the courts were to usurp the executive’s role in 
selecting individuals for prosecution, then one of the essential checks 
on government power would be lost. 
D. Conclusions about Prosecutorial Independence from the Judicial 
Branch 
The Constitution prescribes that the judicial branch’s only role in 
the criminal justice process is to determine individual guilt or 
innocence and impose appropriate punishment. The courts play no role 
in the creation of federal crimes; that is a power exclusively reserved to 
Congress. Similarly, the courts play no role in the selection of 
individuals for prosecution, a power that is exclusively reserved to the 
executive branch. This constitutional division of authority protects 
individual liberty by imposing a check on federal power that requires 
all three branches to perform their separate constitutional duty before 
any individual may be subjected to criminal punishment. 
 
with enough power to serve the expansive purposes set forth in the preamble of the 
Constitution, yet one that would ‘secure the blessings of liberty’ rather than use its 
power tyrannically. 
Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 62. Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 603 (1991) [hereinafter Peterson, Contempt of Congress].  
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III. FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE 
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
Similar constraints prevent the legislative branch from mandating 
the prosecution of particular cases. Indeed, because Congress is such a 
politically responsive body, the dangers of politically motivated 
prosecutions make the restrictions on Congress even more potent than 
the restrictions on the federal courts. This section will first examine the 
general prohibition on congressional initiation of prosecutions. It will 
then turn to the strict applications of the prohibition that apply even in 
the case of criminal contempt of Congress citations and congressional 
oversight of open criminal investigations. 
A. Congressional Power to Initiate Criminal Investigations or Cases 
The same constitutional principles that prohibit judicial 
participation in the decision to prosecute apply more strongly to 
Congress, which, because of its highly politicized nature, could threaten 
the integrity of a criminal investigation. In upholding the independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, the Supreme 
Court relied heavily on the fact that the statute gave Congress no 
formal role in selecting individuals for prosecution, nor any control 
over the selection or removal of the independent counsel.63 The Court 
noted with respect to the removal power: 
This case does not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a 
role in the removal of executive officials other than its established 
powers of impeachment and conviction. The Act instead puts the 
removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch; an 
independent counsel may be removed from office only by the 
personal action of the Attorney General, and only for good cause. 
There is no requirement of congressional approval of the Attorney 
General’s removal decision, though the decision is subject to judicial 
review.64 
With respect to the issue whether the statute created an impermissible 
aggrandizement of Congress’s powers, the Court stated: 
We observe first that this case does not involve an attempt by 
Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive 
 
 63. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (“[T]his case does not involve an 
attempt by Congress itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials.”); id. at 693–96 
(“The Act does empower certain Members of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply 
for the appointment of an independent counsel . . . .”).  
 64. Id. at 685 (citations, footnotes, and internal quotations omitted).  
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Branch . . . . Indeed, with the exception of the power of 
impeachment—which applies to all officers of the United States—
Congress retained for itself no powers of control or supervision over 
an independent counsel. The Act does empower certain Members 
of Congress to request the Attorney General to apply for the 
appointment of an independent counsel, but the Attorney General 
has no duty to comply with the request, although he must respond 
within a certain time limit.65 
The clear implication of the Court’s opinion is that, had the statute 
given Congress authority to appoint, remove, or control the 
independent counsel, it would have created a serious constitutional 
problem.66 Under our constitutional scheme, there simply is no role for 
Congress in the prosecution of individual cases.67 The Founders 
recognized that the combination of legislative and prosecutorial power 
is a much more explosive mixture than the combination of judicial and 
prosecutorial power because the former would likely lead to the abuse 
of power due to the highly political nature of the legislature.68 Madison 
argued: 
[I]n a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is 
carefully limited both in the extent and the duration of its power; 
and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which 
is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid 
confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel 
all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as 
to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means 
which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of 
this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy 
and exhaust all their precautions.69 
Madison and others particularly feared that the judicial power of 
determining individual guilt or innocence might be usurped by the 
legislature.70 
 
 65. Id. at 694 (citations omitted). 
 66. See Peterson, Procedural Checks, supra note 35, at 221 (explaining that the limitation on 
the President’s power to remove the independent counsel did not present remotely as significant 
a constitutional issue as would a provision giving power to Congress to appoint or direct a 
prosecutor).  
 67. See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (stating that “[a]fter enacting 
a statute, Congress may not mandate the prosecution of violators of that statute” and the 
President has “prosecutorial discretion and pardon powers” as a mechanism to protect citizens 
from “oppressive laws” and further protected “by an independent jury and Judiciary”).  
 68. Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 435 (1987). 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333–34 (James Madison) (J. Cooke Ed., 1961). 
 70. Id. at 337; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 195 (stating 
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The Constitution reflects this suspicion of any legislative 
involvement in the adjudication of individual guilt or innocence, as 
evidenced in the Bill of Attainder Clause.71 Historically, Sixteenth 
Century Parliament would single out and punish the political enemies 
of the Crown.72 The Clause’s inclusion in the Constitution 
demonstrates the Framers’ deep distrust of any legislative involvement 
in determinations of individual guilt or innocence, and it explains the 
Framers’ specific constitutional remedy of separating the functions 
involved in the prosecution and conviction of crimes.73 In the Court’s 
words, the Clause serves as a “bulwark against tyranny.”74 
Given these strong constitutional policies, the Supreme Court has 
consistently ruled that Congress’s role is to adopt legislation of general 
applicability. These laws are applied and implemented by the executive 
branch, and adjudications of individual guilt or innocence remain in the 
realm of the judiciary: “It is the peculiar province of the legislature to 
prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application 
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of 
other departments.”75 This conclusion reflects a clear understanding of 
the dangers posed by the involvement of the most political branch in 
any aspects of the determination of individual guilt or innocence. As 
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Lovett,76 
Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in 
special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property 
of particular named persons, because the legislature thinks them 
guilty of conduct which deserves punishment.77 
Of course, legislative control over prosecution of a crime would not 
in and of itself constitute a bill of attainder. Nevertheless, the Bill of 
Attainder Clause, the cases interpreting that clause, and the other 
expressions of constitutional concern over any legislative involvement 
 
that the Legislature “has accordingly in many instances decided rights which should have been left 
to judicial controversy . . . .”(emphasis added)). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442–46 (1965); United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316–18 (1946). 
 72. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 441–42.  
 73. Paul Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 308–09 (1989).  
 74. Brown, 381 U.S. at 443.  
 75. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810); see also Brown, 381 U.S. at 446 (quoting Peck, 
10 U.S. at 136). 
 76. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).  
 77. Id. at 317; see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The 
Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one 
person to the ‘tyranny of shifting majorities.’”). 
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in the determination of individual guilt or innocence suggest that there 
are powerful constitutional problems with any legislative involvement 
in the criminal adjudication process other than passing statutes of 
general applicability. Because Congress is far less isolated than the 
courts from political pressures, allowing it to participate in 
prosecutorial decisions presents dangerous risks of politically 
motivated decision-making.78 
B. Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Criminal Contempt of Congress 
Statute 
Congress lacks the power to initiate a prosecution even in cases of 
criminal contempt of Congress, despite arguments that the criminal 
contempt statute could be construed to require the executive to act and 
that Congress must be able to mandate prosecution to protect its 
constitutional prerogatives. The criminal contempt of Congress statute 
contains two principal sections, United States Code Title 2, sections 192 
and 194. Section 192, which sets forth the criminal offense of contempt 
of Congress, makes it a misdemeanor for any summoned witness before 
either House of Congress or its committees to “willfully . . . default, or 
who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the 
question under inquiry.”79 Section 194 purports to impose duties on the 
Speaker of the House or the President of the Senate, as the case may 
be, and the United States Attorney, to take certain actions leading to 
the prosecution of persons certified by a House of Congress to have 
failed to produce information in response to a subpoena. It provides 
that if a witness fails to provide subpoenaed documents or testimony 
and the House or Senate adopts a contempt of Congress resolution: 
it shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate or the Speaker 
of the House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify, 
the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or 
House, as the case may be, to the appropriate United States Attorney, 
 
 78. See supra Part I. It does not seem to be a persuasive defense against this point to suggest 
that the executive branch may bring prosecutions for politically motivated reasons as well. It is, 
of course, possible that political considerations may play a role in some executive branch 
prosecutorial decisions, although there are both constitutional and customary restrictions on such 
influence. It hardly warrants a concession to congressional political influence of the prosecutorial 
process to suggest that there have been executive abuses in the past. Surely the separation of 
powers, if it has any meaning, is designed to keep the branches within certain bounds in order to 
minimize the chances for abuse of power. That abuses may occur is no justification for ignoring 
the protections that the separation of powers was designed to provide. 
 79. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2018) (emphasis added).  
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whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the Grand Jury for 
its action.80 
Section 194 does not expressly require the United States Attorney 
to bring a contempt prosecution or even sign an indictment with 
respect to individuals cited for contempt of Congress. The statute refers 
simply to the “duty” of the United States Attorney to bring the matter 
“before the grand jury for its action.” Many members of Congress, 
however, have insisted that, at the very least, the United States 
Attorney must submit every contempt-of-Congress citation to a grand 
jury for possible indictment.81 Several commentators have agreed with 
Congress and argued that the statute divests the United States 
Attorney of any discretion in deciding whether to refer a contempt-of-
Congress citation to a grand jury.82 One commentator summed up this 
position as follows: 
The duties of the executive under § 194 are mandatory. The statute 
calls on the executive, as the enforcer of the laws, to act as a 
necessary conduit between the legislative and judicial branches. The 
required action involves neither independent judgment of guilt or 
innocence nor a great expenditure of time, effort, or expense. It 
simply requires a presentation of a contempt citation to a grand jury. 
The allegation that discretion exists is without legal or logical 
foundation.83 
Notwithstanding these arguments, the constitutional concerns 
about congressional influence over individual prosecutions are so 
strong that they apply even in the case of criminal contempt of 
 
 80. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2018) (emphasis added).  
 81. For example, during the dispute between the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
Department of Justice over a congressional subpoena to the EPA, House officials argued that the 
United States Attorney was required to present the contempt of Congress citation to the grand 
jury. See Leslie Maitland, Administration Battles Citation of E.P.A. Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 
1982, at 1 (“The House resolution directed the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia to present a criminal contempt case against Mrs. Gorsuch to a grand jury.”); see also 
Peterson, Congressional Oversight, supra note 10, at 1398–1401 (describing the House contempt 
citation process against EPA Administrator Gorsuch). 
 82. Stanley Brand, the former General Counsel to the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives, has urged: “[T]he better argument is that [S]ection 194 requires that all witnesses 
cited by a House of Congress for contempt and referred to the United States Attorney be brought 
before the grand jury.” Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: 
Preserving a Prompt and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands 
Against Executive Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 86–87 (1986) [hereinafter Brand & 
Connelly]. 
 83. Robert E. Palmer, Note, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches: 
An Examination of the Constitutional Balance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11 
PEPP. L. REV. 331, 357–58 (1984). 
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Congress. The Department of Justice traditionally has taken the view 
that the United States Attorney retains the discretion to decide 
whether to refer a contempt-of-Congress citation to a grand jury.84 
Although notable cases of executive non-referral have been rare, there 
have been instances in which the DOJ has declined to refer contempt 
citations to the grand jury. One such instance occurred in 1960 in the 
context of another dispute with a government agency over 
congressional access to documents. In that case, the Port of New York 
Authority (which had been established by an interstate compact 
approved by Congress) asserted, on instructions from the Governors of 
New York and New Jersey, a claim of privilege in response to a 
Judiciary Committee subpoena for a large number of documents 
concerning the Port Authority’s operations. As a result of the Port 
Authority’s failure to produce documents, the House approved 
contempt-of-Congress citations against three of the Authority’s 
principal officers.85 Although Congress referred the contempt 
resolutions to the United States Attorney for prosecution,86 the United 
States Attorney never referred any of the contempt citations to a grand 
jury. One of the three officials was ultimately prosecuted by 
information rather than indictment, while the remaining two were 
never prosecuted in spite of congressional demands to refer all three to 
a grand jury for indictment.87 Thus, the Department used its 
 
 84. For example, in the brief filed by the Department of Justice in United States v. House of 
Representatives, the Department argued that “Section 194 does not require the United States 
Attorney to initiate a prosecution.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-435, at 1610 (1985). 
 85. See 106 CONG. REC. 17258, 17281 (1960) (recommending a citation against Austin J. 
Tobin, Executive Director of the Authority); 106 CONG. REC. 17258, 17316 (1960) (offering a 
privileged resolution against S. Sloan Colt, Chairman of the Board of Directors); 106 CONG. REC. 
17258, 17319 (1960) (recommending citation against Joseph G. Carty, Secretary). The contempt 
resolution in each case reads as follows: 
Resolved, that the speaker of the House of Representatives certify the report of the 
Committee on the Judiciary as to the contumacious conduct of [name] in failing and 
refusing to furnish certain documents in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum of a 
duly constituted subcommittee of said committee served upon him and as ordered by 
the subcommittee, together with all of the facts in connection therewith, under seal of 
the House of Representatives, to the United States Attorney for the District of 
Columbia, to the end that [name] may be proceeded against in the manner and form 
provided by law.  
 86. See C.P. Trussell, House Cites Three in Port Authority in Contempt Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 1960, at 1 (“The question of contempt of Congress now goes to the Department of Justice 
with a House recommendation that the matter be handled ‘in the manner and form provided by 
law.’”).  
 87. See Alvin Shuster, Port Board Chief is Accused by U.S. in Contempt Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 26, 1960, at 1 (describing the contempt-of-Congress process).  
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prosecutorial discretion to insulate specific individuals from 
prosecution for contempt of Congress. 
Department of Justice officials have reiterated this view in 
congressional testimony and OLC opinions. In congressional testimony 
given in 1976, the Department took the position that if an executive 
officer were cited for contempt because of an assertion of executive 
privilege and “the Department determined to its satisfaction that the 
claim was rightfully made, it would not, in the exercise of its 
prosecutorial discretion, present the matter to a grand jury.”88 In 1984, 
OLC, in an opinion signed by Assistant Attorney General Theodore 
Olson, concluded not only that the Constitution prohibits Congress 
from mandating an individual contempt prosecution, but that it also 
prohibits Congress from requiring the Department of Justice to refer a 
contempt-of-Congress citation to a grand jury.89 
For a number of reasons, the Department’s opinion seems to be 
clearly correct.90 First, in several cases the D.C. Circuit has assumed that 
the United States Attorney retains some discretion in deciding whether 
to refer a citation for contempt of Congress to a grand jury where they 
refused to entertain pre-enforcement challenges to congressional 
subpoenas. These decisions rested in part on the ground that the 
subpoenaed witness would have a chance to persuade the Unites States 
Attorney not to prosecute if the witness were subsequently cited for 
contempt of Congress. For example, in Ansara v. Eastland, the D.C. 
Circuit dismissed a suit to quash a congressional subpoena on the 
ground that interfering with an ongoing congressional investigation 
would be an inappropriate exercise of its equitable power.91 The court 
concluded that a subpoenaed witness would not be greatly prejudiced 
by the absence of judicial relief because he could find alternative 
protection “within the legislative branch or elsewhere.”92 In a footnote, 
the court stated that these protections could be found “perhaps in the 
executive branch which may decide not to present the matter to the 
 
 88. Testimony of Assistant Attorney Gen. Rex Lee, Hearings on Representation of Congress 
and Congressional Interest in Courts, Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). 
 89. Olson Memorandum, supra note 19, at 102.  
 90. See generally Peterson, Contempt of Congress, supra note 62 (arguing that Congress 
should not be able to exercise prosecutorial authority to force the executive to charge contempt 
of Congress allegations). 
 91. See 442 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“[I]n the absence of establishment by Congress 
of a procedure for advance judicial consideration and declaration, we do not think the courts can 
soundly interject themselves in cases like this for the purpose of granting emergency relief.”). 
 92. Id. 
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grand jury (as occurred in the case of the officials of the New York Port 
Authority);93 or perhaps in the Grand Jury which may decide not to 
return a true bill.”94 In United States Servicemen’s Fund v. Eastland,95 
the D.C. Circuit reviewed a third-party challenge to a congressional 
subpoena. The court heard the case in spite of the earlier precedents 
denying pre-enforcement review, because, in part, the plaintiffs would 
have no opportunity to vindicate their rights through a contempt 
proceeding in which they might “seek to convince the executive (the 
Attorney General’s representative) not to prosecute . . . .”96 
Significantly, these cases emphasize the importance of allowing a 
potential defendant the ability to persuade a federal prosecutor not to 
press charges, which preserves the requirement that all three branches 
maintain their independent roles in the federal criminal justice system. 
Nevertheless, given the holding of Young, where the Supreme 
Court allowed federal courts to appoint prosecutors for criminal 
contempt of court,97 one could argue that Congress needs the right to 
require prosecution of its own contempt cases. After all, if the courts 
are empowered to appoint prosecutors to bring criminal contempt 
charges against those who interfere with a court’s ability to carry out 
its constitutional functions, perhaps Congress has a correlative right to 
prosecute those who interfere with Congress’s ability to carry out its 
own constitutional mandate. This appealing notion should be resisted, 
however, because the branches of the federal government are not 
symmetrical; each is unique in the powers it possesses and the extent to 
which it reflects and responds to political pressure. Because each 
branch is unique, the constitutional concerns about the potential abuse 
of power differ from branch to branch. The constitutional authority that 
 
 93. Id. Several articles have questioned the persuasiveness of this decision on the ground 
that “the Court’s language in Ansara is somewhat mysterious in view of the fact that there does 
not appear to be any such Port Authority case in which grand jury presentment failed to occur 
following congressional referral.” Brand & Connelly, supra note 82, at 86 n. 109; see also James 
Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislature Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Disputes 
Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145, 154 n.58 (1984) (“It is 
unclear what case the D.C. Circuit was referring to in this rather cryptic statement, for it cited no 
case involving the New York Port Authority.”). It seems clear, however, that the Court of 
Appeals was referring to the contempt citations of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director of the Port 
Authority, Sloan Colt, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Port Authority and Joseph G. 
Carty, the Secretary of the Port Authority, who were cited for contempt of Congress in 1960. 
None of these contempt citations were ever referred to the grand jury and only one was ever 
prosecuted. See infra text accompanying notes 98–89. 
 94. Ansara, 442 F.2d at 754 n.6. 
 95. 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).  
 96. Id. at 1260. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 54–60.  
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may be necessary and appropriate for the judicial branch may be 
unnecessary and potentially dangerous in the hands of the legislature. 
For several reasons, this is the case with respect to prosecutions for 
contempt of Congress. 
First, the courts have a greater need to initiate a contempt 
prosecution than Congress, which is amply empowered to protect its 
prerogatives by political means that are not available to the courts. The 
Court in Young seemed to be responding to fears about the judiciary’s 
inability to protect itself, a fear that dates back to the adoption of the 
Constitution. In one of the best-known passages from the Federalist, 
Hamilton declared: 
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the 
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it 
will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them . . . . The 
judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no 
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and 
can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have 
neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of 
its judgments.98 
Unlike the courts, Congress has ample weapons to utilize against the 
President if it concludes the executive branch is preventing it from 
performing its functions. The history of executive disputes provides a 
classic example of the power of Congress’s access to the press as a 
means to mobilize political power against the executive branch.99 If 
Congress has the political will to persevere in an investigation, it 
virtually always wins and is able to obtain the records that it 
legitimately needs.100 
Not only does Congress have less of a need to mandate contempt 
prosecution, but the dangers of allowing Congress to mandate a 
prosecution are significantly greater. The federal district courts are 
relatively more immune from political pressure, as they are governed 
by precedent and subject to review by courts of appeals. Thus, although 
the concentration of prosecutorial power together with judicial 
authority is not without significant dangers, the accumulation of powers 
 
 98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 99. See Todd David Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 77, 139–46 (2011) (describing how Congress used the media, its advice and consent 
power, and negotiations to obtain the information it wanted from the Executive). 
 100. See id. (noting that the Congresses during the Reagan, Clinton, and the George W. Bush 
administrations were able to obtain the information and documents they wanted).  
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is not as volatile as it would be in a more political context. The 
constitutional separation of powers contemplates that there will not 
only be one check before conviction is possible, but two; the judicial 
branch must convict after the executive branch has decided to 
prosecute. Regardless of whether Young is correctly decided, it need 
not be extended to contempt of Congress, where the need for such 
additional power is far less than it is in the case of the judiciary and the 
potential for political abuse is so much greater. 
C. Congressional Oversight of Criminal Investigations 
The rationale for limiting Congress’s power to initiate or control 
any criminal investigation applies even in the context of oversight 
hearings. Congressional disclosure of information obtained from open 
criminal investigations has the real potential to apply inappropriate 
political pressure on the prosecutorial decision-making process. As 
former Senator Carl Levin explained: 
Only the executive branch has the constitutional authority to 
prosecute. Congress can, when it comes across what it thinks is 
criminal activity, refer a matter to the Justice Department for 
possible prosecution, but its role and authority stops there. Should 
it seek to try to influence the discretionary authority of the 
executive branch in a prosecutorial matter, the third branch of 
government, the judiciary, could throw out the prosecution based on 
political influence.101 
Because of the potential for undue political influence and numerous 
other problems, the Department of Justice has traditionally refused to 
disclose to Congress any information from open criminal investigation 
files.102 
The Department’s position was first explained in a 1941 opinion by 
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson.103 Jackson’s opinion took the 
form of a response to a request from the Chair of the House Committee 
on Naval Affairs for FBI and Department of Justice “reports, 
memoranda, and correspondence . . . in connection with ‘investigations 
 
 101. Carl Levin, Congress Dangerously Wields its Oversight Power in Russia Probe, THE HILL 
(May 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/387648-congress-dangerously-
wields-its-oversight-power-in-russia-probe. 
 102. See Peterson, Congressional Oversight, supra note 10, at 1385–1411 (describing how there 
is little precedent of the Executive providing Congress with information from open criminal 
investigations). 
 103. Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative Reports, 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 
45, 1941 WL 1875 (Jackson, A.G.). 
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made by the Department of Justice arising out of’ labor disputes at 
businesses with naval contracts.”104 Attorney General Jackson rejected 
the request and cited examples, dating back to 1904, in which the 
Attorney General had refused to disclose information from open 
criminal investigative files.105 These refusals were, in Jackson’s view, 
consistent with other instances in which the executive branch had 
asserted privilege in response to congressional requests for 
information.106 The Attorney General concluded that the information 
sought by Congress was “chiefly valuable, for use by the Executive 
Branch of the Government in the executions of the laws. It can be of 
little, if any, value with the framing of legislation or with a performance 
of any other constitutional duty [by] Congress . . . . Certainly, the evil 
which would necessarily flow from its untimely publication would far 
outweigh any possible good.”107 
In a 1969 opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel stated that the reason 
for protecting information from open criminal investigations was to 
protect against potential improper congressional influence. “The 
executive cannot effectively investigate if Congress is, in a sense, a 
partner in the investigation. If a congressional committee is fully 
apprised of all details of an investigation as the investigation proceeds, 
there are substantial dangers that congressional pressures will 
influence the course of the investigation.”108 In order to protect 
potential defendants from politically motivated prosecutions, Congress 
must not be involved in any open criminal investigations. 
OLC reiterated this position in a 1986 opinion for the Attorney 
General concerning congressional requests for information regarding 
decisions made under the Independent Counsel Act.109 In that opinion, 
 
 104. Id. at 45. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 50. Attorney General Herbert Brownell reaffirmed the policy set forth in the 
Jackson opinion in 1956. See May 15, 1956 Memorandum of Attorney General Brownell, 
reprinted in Mercury Pollution and Enforcement of the Refuse Act of 1899: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government 
Operations, Part I, 92d Cong. 26–27 (1971). Attorney General Brownell permitted disclosures 
from certain closed files, but stated that with respect to open cases, “the file may not be available 
for examination by the committee’s representative.” Id.  
 108. Congressional Subpoenas of Department of Justice Investigations, 8 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 252, 263 (1984), 1984 WL 178369 (quoting Memorandum for Edward L. Morgan, Deputy 
Counsel to the President, from Thomas E. Kauper, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office 
of Legal Counsel, Re: Submission of Open CID Investigation Files 2 (Dec. 19, 1969)).  
 109. Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under 
the Independent Counsel Act, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 68, 68 (1986). 
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Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper recognized that Congress 
had a “legitimate legislative interest in overseeing the Department’s 
enforcement of the Independent Counsel Act and relevant criminal 
statutes in determining whether legislative revisions to the act should 
be made.”110 Cooper warned, however, that “Congress could not justify 
an investigation based on its disagreement with the prosecutorial 
decision regarding appointment of an independent counsel for a 
particular individual. Congress simply cannot constitutionally second 
guess that decision.”111 Even where Congress has a general legislative 
interest in reviewing the implementation of a statute, Cooper stated, 
“the policy of the Executive Branch throughout the Nation’s history 
has generally been to decline to provide committees of Congress with 
access to, or copies of, open law enforcement files except in 
extraordinary circumstances.”112 Open files must be protected in order 
to avoid congressional pressures that might unduly influence an 
investigation given the “well-founded fears that the perception of the 
integrity, impartiality, and fairness of the law enforcement process as a 
whole will be damaged if sensitive material is distributed beyond those 
persons necessarily involved in the investigation and prosecution 
process.”113 
In 1993, former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti explained and 
further developed the traditional position of the Department of 
Justice.114 In a speech at the Heritage Foundation, Civiletti cited a 
House investigation of the Department’s Environmental Crimes Unit 
and protested the Department’s decision to make line attorneys 
available for congressional questioning.115 Attorney General Civiletti 
explained that the Constitution vests the decision on whom to 
prosecute in the executive branch and does not permit Congress to 
influence the Department’s decisions in individual cases.116 According 
to Civiletti, congressional involvement in individual cases presents the 
 
 110. Id. at 74. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 76. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Benjamin R. Civiletti, Justice Unbalanced: Congress and Prosecutorial Discretion, THE 
HERITAGE LECTURES NO. 472, 1 (Nov. 12, 1993), https://www.heritage.org/political-
process/report/justice-unbalanced-congress-and-prosecutorial-discretion [hereinafter Civiletti]. 
 115. See id.; see also Jerry Seper, Hill Probe of Justice Lawyers Hampers Agency, Civiletti 
Says, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A4 (“Mr. Civiletti said the ruling . . . will undermine the 
power of the executive branch of government to carry out its constitutionally assigned role.”). 
 116. Civiletti, supra note 114, at 34. 
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risk of improper political influence in an individual’s case.117 Thus, in 
the Department’s view, congressional involvement threatens not only 
the separation of powers, but individual liberty as well.118 
Congress has, on occasion, attempted to push back against the 
Department’s refusal to disclose information from open criminal 
investigation files. After Attorney General Civiletti’s speech received 
wide attention in the media,119 the House Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
commissioned a Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) study to 
respond to Attorney General Civiletti’s views.120 This memorandum 
took the position that 
[N]umerous pertinent Supreme Court precedent[s] in this area, 
never mentioned by Mr. Civiletti, support a broad and 
encompassing power in the Congress to engage in oversight and 
investigation of the administration of executive agencies that would 
reach all sources of information that would enable it to carry out its 
legislative function. In the absence of a countervailing constitutional 
privilege or a self-imposed statutory restriction upon its authority, 
the Congress, and its committees, have plenary power to compel 
information needed to discharge its legislative function from 
executive agencies, private persons and organizations, and, within 
certain constraints, the information so obtained may be made 
public.121 
The CRS memorandum cited Supreme Court precedent supporting 
the general investigative power of Congress and relied on “significant 
historical precedent . . . for committees receiving documents and 
testimony as to both open and closed cases as a result of 
accommodation, voluntary or otherwise.”122 In addition, the 
 
 117. Id. at 5.  
 118. The framers linked the two principles together and believed that the separation of 
powers provided a solid bulwark against infringements on individual liberty. Rebecca Brown, 
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1531 (1991). 
 119. E.g., Editorial, General Dingell, WALL STREET J., Sept. 2, 1993, at A12. 
 120. Morton Rosenberg, Legal and Historical Substantiality of Former Attorney General 
Civiletti’s Views as to the Scope and Reach of Congress’s Authority to Conduct Oversight in the 
Department of Justice, CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 15, 1993), reprinted in Hearing: “EPA’s Criminal 
Enforcement Program,” Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong. 12–41 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 CRS Memorandum]; TODD 
GARVEY, CONG. RES. SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 
(2017) (examining the source of the contempt power).  
 121. 1993 CRS Memorandum, supra note 120, at 2. 
 122. Id. at 6.  
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memorandum relied upon case law that upheld the power of Congress 
to investigate matters that were the subject of pending litigation.123 
According to the CRS memorandum, the potentially prejudicial effect 
that congressional hearings may have on pending cases was insufficient 
to deny Congress access to material from criminal files.124 
Finally, the CRS memorandum rejected the view that “prosecution 
is an inherently Executive function” and that congressional access to 
information related to the exercise of that function is thereby limited.125 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, which 
sustained the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions 
of the Ethics in Government Act, the CRS memorandum argued that 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion “is in no way ‘central’ to the 
functioning of the executive branch.”126 Thus, the memorandum 
concluded, “in the face of legitimate committee oversight there can be 
no credible claim of encroachment or aggrandizement by the 
legislature of essential Executive powers.”127 As a consequence, the 
appropriate judicial test is one that determines whether the challenged 
legislative action “prevents the executive branch from accomplishing 
its assigned functions” and, if so, “whether that impact is justified by an 
overriding need to promote objectives within the congressional 
authority of Congress.”128 Using this test, the CRS memorandum 
concluded: 
Congressional oversight and access to documents in testimony, 
unlike the action of a court, cannot stop a prosecution or set limits 
on the management of a particular case. Access to information by 
itself does not disturb the authority and discretion of the Executive 
branch to decide whether to prosecute a case.129 
As a result, “the fact that information is sought on the Executive’s 
enforcement of criminal laws would not in itself seem to preclude 
congressional inquiry.”130 
 
 123. Id at 6–7 (citing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 294 (1929), and Delaney v. United 
States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952)). 
 124. 1993 CRS Memorandum, supra note 120, at 9. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988)). 
 127. Id. at 11. 
 128. Id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989)). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; see also Mort Rosenberg, Why Congressional Inquiries Trump Federal Investigations, 
PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/05/why-congressional-
inquiries-trump-federal-investigations/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2019, 3:32 PM) (“There appears to 
be no court precedent that imposes a threshold burden on committees . . . . An inquiring 
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The chief problem with the CRS position is that it fails to address 
the principal rationale for blocking congressional access to open 
criminal investigative files, which is the potential for improper 
congressional influence over decisions about whom to prosecute. The 
issue is not whether congressional access “prevents the executive 
branch from accomplishing its assigned functions”; rather, the issue is 
whether congressional access gives Congress the power to influence 
individual cases, which is authority that should not reside in the 
legislative branch. This is an aggrandizement problem, not an 
interference problem, and the Supreme Court has been much more 
vigilant about aggrandizement issues than it has with respect to 
interference issues.131 The concern is not whether Congress impedes the 
work of the Department. Rather, congressional influence presents the 
risk of that politics may play a role in prosecutorial decisions that 
should be based on the merits of the case alone. 
Moreover, the historical record simply does not support 
congressional access to open investigative files as opposed to closed 
files where the potential for influencing prosecutorial decisions is not 
as great. A number of factors are significant in analyzing the relevant 
historical record. First, it is important to distinguish between 
investigations of Department of Justice misconduct and investigations 
of departmental inaction or failure to prosecute. The former types of 
investigations present many fewer risks to individual rights and may 
indeed serve to protect them. The latter create the risk of politically 
influenced prosecutorial action, which may interfere with individual 
rights. Second, one must distinguish between civil and criminal 
investigations. Although there is a potential for improper congressional 
influence over both, the concerns are greater in the context of criminal 
investigations, which can involve much greater intrusions on individual 
rights. Third, it is important to determine the stage of an investigation 
at the time Congress seeks information. Here, it is not only important 
to distinguish between open and closed investigations, but also between 
investigations in which the Department has already secured 
indictments and investigations that are still in the preliminary pre-
 
committee need only show that the information it seeks is within the broad subject matter of its 
authorized jurisdiction, is in aid of a legitimate legislative function, and is pertinent to the area of 
concern.”).  
 131. See Peterson, Procedural Checks, supra note 35, at 220–21 (describing how the Court 
typically takes a functionalist approach when a statute restricts or, in other words, interferes, with 
the power of a branch but a formalist approach when a statute seeks to aggrandize power in a 
particular branch). 
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indictment phase. In the former, the DOJ has already decided to 
proceed against particular individuals, and the danger of a 
congressional investigation relates principally to disclosure of a 
roadmap to the prosecution’s case. In the latter, these concerns are 
compounded by the much weightier concern that Congress might 
influence the Department to bring a case that it might not otherwise 
have decided to prosecute. 
Based upon these principles, an earlier study concluded that there 
were no significant historical precedents supporting Congress’s right to 
obtain documents from open criminal investigations.132 Since that time, 
congressional advocates have added additional investigations to the list 
of proposed precedents for such investigations, most notably in an 
update of the earlier Congressional Research Service report published 
in 2012.133 This article examines these new precedents to determine if 
any support congressional access to open criminal investigation files. 
1. The Removal and Replacement of United States Attorneys in 
2006 
In 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales controversially fired 
and replaced nine United States Attorneys. In the wake of allegations 
that the firings were prompted by the failure of the United States 
Attorneys to initiate politically motivated investigations and 
prosecutions, Congress began a series of hearings related to the 
firings.134 These congressional oversight hearings ultimately generated 
congressional subpoenas and an assertion of executive privilege by the 
 
 132. See Peterson, Congressional Oversight, supra note 10, at 1447–48 (“In order to prevent 
[congressional interference] from occurring, the President and the DOJ should reassert the 
traditional position of the DOJ that Congress may not have access to open criminal investigative 
files.”).  
 133. See generally ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42811, 
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1920-2012: HISTORY, 
LAW, AND PRACTICE (2012) (updating the 2012 CRS report) [hereinafter Dolan & Garvey]. 
 134. See generally Restoring Checks and Balances in the Confirmation Process of United States 
Attorneys: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Insuring Executive Branch Accountability: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. (2007); Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorneys Controversy: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Continuing Investigation into the U.S. Attorneys Controversy and Related Matters 
(Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Continuing Investigation into the EUS Attorneys Controversy 
and Related Matters (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (presenting hearings related to the 
firings of U.S. Attorneys). 
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President in connection with the subpoenas issued to White House 
Counsel Harriet Miers and the White House Chief of Staff, Joshua 
Bolten.135 After the Department of Justice refused to refer the House’s 
contempt citation to a grand jury, the House filed a civil enforcement 
action in federal district court.136 In that case, the D.C. federal district 
court granted the Committee’s motion for partial summary judgment 
and held that “Ms. Miers is not absolutely immune from congressional 
process” and that she had to appear before the Committee to provide 
testimony.137 Although the court clearly upheld the legitimacy of the 
House Committee’s investigation, neither the subpoenas nor any other 
part of the investigation dealt with open criminal investigations. Thus, 
the incident does not stand as a precedent for such congressional 
authority. 
2. CIA Agent Identity Leak 
After columnist Robert Novak wrote a column that revealed the 
identity of Valerie Plame Wilson, a covert CIA agent, the FBI 
commenced an investigation into whether the White House had 
illegally disclosed Plame’s identity.138 The disclosure was in retaliation 
for remarks made by her husband, former U.S. ambassador Joseph 
Wilson, which were critical of the Bush Administration.139 In 2007, Vice 
President Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, was 
convicted of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making a false 
statement to federal investigators concerning the alleged illegal 
disclosure.140 After this trial, the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee began an investigation into the security leak and 
ultimately subpoenaed documents from the Department of Justice 
investigation, including transcripts of the interviews with the President 
and Vice President.141 The Department of Justice resisted disclosure of 
these transcripts and, ultimately, the President formally asserted a claim 
of executive privilege over the relevant documents.142 
 
 135. See DOLAN & GARVEY, supra note 133, at 40.  
 136. See Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that 
former White House Counsel was not entitled to absolute immunity from testifying). 
 137. Id. at 98, 108. 
 138. DOLAN & GARVEY, supra note 133, at 41.  
 139. Id. at 42.  
 140. Id. at 41.  
 141. Id. at 42. 
 142. Id. at 42–43. 
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Although the Committee scheduled a hearing on a potential 
contempt of Congress citation, it was postponed and the Committee 
did not pursue further action on the subpoena.143 This investigation 
provides no support for congressional claims of authority to investigate 
open criminal investigations.144 Although the Department of Justice did 
provide some information relating to the investigation, this did not take 
place until after the investigation and trial had been completed.145 
Moreover, even with respect to the closed investigation, the 
Department successfully resisted the Committee’s efforts to obtain the 
President’s and Vice President’s interview transcripts. 
3. Operation Fast and Furious 
In 2011, whistleblowers within the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF), an agency within the Department of 
Justice, claimed that an ATF initiative dubbed “Operation Fast and 
Furious” had permitted straw purchases of firearms to be distributed to 
drug cartel members in Mexico.146 In 2010, two of these guns were 
found near a shootout that had resulted in the death of a U.S. border 
patrol agent.147 In a March 2011 letter to the Department of Justice, the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee requested all 
documents and communications regarding Operation Fast and 
Furious.148 In response to a subsequent Committee subpoena, the 
Department of Justice produced numerous redacted files but refused 
to disclose certain documents that “contain[ed] detailed information 
about . . . investigative activities . . . including information that would 
identify investigative subjects, sensitive techniques, anticipated actions, 
and other details that would assist individuals in evading our law 
enforcement effort.”149 Furthermore, the Department argued that other 
documents were “withheld in order to protect pending criminal 
investigations and prosecutions.”150 
Upon receiving the above documents, the Committee subpoenaed 
Attorney General Eric Holder to obtain the documents the 
 
 143. Id. at 44.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 45. 
 149. Id. at 45 (quoting Letter from Ass’t Att’y Gen. Ronald Weich to Chairman Darrell Issa 
(June 14, 2011)). 
 150. Id. (quotations and internal citations omitted).  
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Department did not produce.151 In response to a draft report for 
committee consideration of a contempt of Congress citation, the 
Department of Justice continued to withhold “core investigative 
materials from . . . ongoing criminal investigations in order to protect 
the independence and integrity of those efforts,” which reflected a 
long-held “non-partisan commitment” to separation-of-powers 
principles dating to the “early part of the 19th Century.”152 In particular, 
the Department protested that disclosure would allow Congress to 
“influence . . . the course of the investigation” or “seriously prejudice 
law enforcement.”153 Eventually, after the Committee agreed to narrow 
its subpoena, negotiations over disclosure collapsed, and President 
Obama asserted a claim of executive privilege over the documents 
because some documents “encompassed executive branch deliberative 
communications” and others contained “information about ongoing 
criminal investigations and prosecutions.”154 
The House approved a formal contempt citation against Attorney 
General Eric Holder for refusing to disclose the documents.155 In 
response, the Deputy Attorney General informed the Speaker of the 
House that the Department would not bring the congressional 
contempt citation before a grand jury or take any other action to 
prosecute the Attorney General.156 The House Committee filed a 
lawsuit against the Department of Justice seeking to obtain civil 
enforcement of the House subpoena.157 Almost four years later, the 
District Court issued an opinion requiring disclosure of some of the 
subpoenaed documents on the ground that the deliberative process 
privilege asserted by the Department of Justice was unwarranted 
because of the substantial disclosure of those documents in an 
intervening report by the Inspector General of the Department of 
Justice.158 For present purposes, the key point is that by the time the 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 46 (quoting Letter from Dep. Att’y Gen. James M. Cole to Chairman Darrell Issa 
(May 15, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/DAGLetter5-15-12.pdf.). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 47. 
 155. Id. at 48. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Complaint, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, no. 1:12-CV-1332 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 13, 2012). 
 158. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(stating that the circumstances “serve to persuade the Court that whatever incremental harm that 
could flow from providing the Committee with the records that have already been publicly 
disclosed is outweighed by the unchallenged need for the material”). Under the Inspector 
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opinion was issued, any pending investigations that might have been 
affected by the documents had long since been closed or resolved.159 
Thus, the ordered disclosures did not affect any pending or open 
criminal investigation. 
The litigation over the enforcement of the House Committee’s 
subpoena dragged on for many years. The court’s first opinion dealt 
with the President’s motion to dismiss on jurisdiction and justiciability 
grounds.160 In particular, the court ruled that the political question 
doctrine did not prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction over the 
executive privilege dispute,161 the court had adequate subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to the federal question statute,162 the 
congressional plaintiff had standing to bring the lawsuit,163 and the 
court was not precluded from issuing a decision on the merits by the 
D.C. Circuit’s doctrine of equitable discretion.164 Thereafter, both 
parties moved for summary judgment: the House Committee on the 
ground that the “Attorney General could not invoke executive 
privilege to shield records that did not involve direct communications 
with the President,”165 and the Department of Justice on the ground 
that “the entire set of records was covered by the deliberative process 
prong of the executive privilege.”166 The court denied both motions 
without prejudice on the ground that “the executive branch could 
properly invoke the deliberative process privilege in response to a 
legislative demand, but that it could not do so unless the prerequisites 
for the application of the privilege had been established.”167 The court 
then ordered the Department to review each of the withheld 
documents, produce all that were not both pre-decisional and 
 
General Act of 1978, the Inspector General has to submit his or her reports to Congress. See Pub. 
Law 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, § 5(b).  
 159. The last person to be prosecuted in connection with the Fast and Furious scheme was 
sentenced on December 12, 2012. See Fernanda Santos, Prison Term in Guns Case Tied to Agent’s 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, at A25.  
 160. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(finding that there is “federal subject matter jurisdiction over this complaint, and it alleges a cause 
of action that plaintiff has standing to bring”). 
 161. Id. at 10–11. 
 162. Id. at 17.  
 163. Id. at 21. 
 164. Id. at 24. 
 165. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Lynch, 156 F. 
Supp. 3d 101, 107 (D.D.C. 2016); Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Holder, Civil Action No. 12–1332 (ABJ), 2014 WL 12662665 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 
2014).  
 166. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 107.  
 167. Id.  
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deliberative, and create a specific index of all documents as to which 
the Department continued to assert privilege.168 
With respect to the documents withheld on the basis of the 
deliberative process privilege, the court ruled that the Department’s list 
was sufficiently detailed to suffice as a basis upon which to assert the 
privilege.169 Moreover, the Court rejected the House Committee’s 
contention that the deliberative process privilege applied only to 
deliberations concerning the development of policy.170 In addition, the 
Court stated it was “mindful of the principles that caution against 
judicial intervention in a dispute between the other two branches, and 
it recognizes that those principles derived from the balance of separate 
powers carefully enunciated in the Constitution.”171 These principles 
led the court to conclude that “in the unique situation presented here, 
the court can decide this issue based on undisputed facts, without 
intruding upon legislative or executive prerogatives and without 
engaging in what would otherwise become a troubling assessment of 
the relative merit and weight of the interests being asserted by either 
party.”172 In the specific circumstances of this case, because the contents 
of the documents as to which the Department asserted a deliberative 
process privilege had already been substantially disclosed by a detailed 
report of the Department’s Inspector General, the Department could 
“point to no particular harm that would flow from compliance with this 
subpoena, for these records, that it did not already bring about itself.”173 
The Department withheld other documents, however, because they 
contained “certain law enforcement sensitive material” and other 
protected information.174 In particular, the court noted the Department 
had requested that the Committee “refrain from contacting or 
subpoenaing cooperating and other witnesses in indicted federal 
criminal cases as part of its investigation of Operation Fast and Furious 
while the criminal matters remain pending.”175 Although, as the court 
remarked, “at oral argument, counsel for the Committee acknowledged 
that these are privileges that are regularly respected in legislative 
requests for information as a matter of comity,” the House argued that 
 
 168. Id. at 108. 
 169. Id. at 108–10. 
 170. Id. at 110–12. 
 171. Id. at 113 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 114. 
 174. Id. at 119 (citing Defendant’s Opposition to Motion to Compel at 27–28).   
 175. Id. at 120 (citing Letter from Ronald Weich to Darrell E. Issa (Apr. 19, 2012)).  
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they did not “have sufficient trust in the Department of Justice to take 
the Department’s word on [redactions]” made to exclude this type of 
privileged material.176 The court rejected the Committee’s argument, 
however, and ruled that it “has been provided with no reason to believe 
that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of 
government assertions made by an officer of the court representing 
another, equal branch of government.”177 As a result, the court denied 
the Committee’s motion with respect to these documents relating to an 
open criminal investigation and ordered the parties to negotiate about 
the resolution of the Committee’s request for this material.178 
Ultimately, the Department of Justice declined to appeal the 
district court’s decision and turned over documents which they had 
claimed the deliberative process privilege.179 The House Committee, 
however, filed an appeal to obtain the remaining documents withheld 
by the Department,180 and two years later the parties finally agreed to 
a settlement that involved disclosure of other documents, although 
none pertaining to any open criminal investigation.181 The settlement, 
however, encountered a snag when District Judge Amy Berman 
Jackson declined to vacate her two rulings, an action that both parties 
had agreed upon as part of the settlement agreement.182 In May of 2019, 
the parties finally informed the court of appeals that they had settled 
the matter (although leaving each side some room to continue to 
negotiate further details).183 Nothing in the case supports Congress’s 
claim to access to material from an open criminal investigation. 
 
 176. Id. (citing Tr. of July 30, 2015 Hearing [Dkt. 109] at 49).  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 120–21. 
 179. Josh Gerstein, Obama Relents in Fight Over Fast and Furious Documents, POLITICO 
(Apr. 8, 2016, 4:59 PM), www.politico.com/story/2016/04/Obama-relents-in-fight-over-fast-and-
furious-documents-221741. 
 180. Brief for Appellant, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform of the U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Barr, No. 16-5078 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 2016), 2016 WL 5868690.  
 181. Todd Ruger, DOJ Agrees to Give Oversight Panel Fast and Furious Documents, ROLL 
CALL (Mar. 7, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policies/DOJ-agrees-give-oversight 
-panel-fast-furious-documents. 
 182. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Sessions, 344 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 183. Katelyn Polantz, Settlement in Fast and Furious Executive Privilege Lawsuit Between 
DOJ and the House, CNN POLITICS, (May 8, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/ 
politics/fast-and-furious-settlement-doj-house/index.html.  
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4. Disclosure of Information Relating to the Mueller Investigation 
of Russian Influence on the 2016 Election 
In a profoundly perverse twist, the only significant disclosure of 
material from open criminal investigation files to Congress came at the 
behest of President Trump’s congressional supporters with the open 
approval and support of President Trump. In July of 2017, aided by 
several members of Congress, the Trump Administration began to go 
on the offensive against Mueller and his team of investigators.184 House 
Republicans obtained “some of the Government’s most sensitive 
investigative files—including secret wire taps and the existence of an 
FBI informant—that were part of the Russia inquiry.”185 President 
Trump urged the members of Congress in private phone conversations 
“to keep up the House Republicans’ oversight work.”186 Furthermore, 
President Trump pressured administration officials, including Deputy 
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, to share sensitive materials from 
the open Russian investigation with Congress.187 Devin Nunes, the 
Chair of the House Intelligence Committee, threatened to hold the 
Deputy Attorney General in contempt or impeach him if he did not 
produce the investigative documents, including the file that was the 
basis for commencing the Russia investigation.188 Members of Congress 
unabashedly acknowledged that their investigative efforts had helped 
the President’s defense.189 
Former Department of Justice officials bemoaned these disclosures 
as setting a terrible precedent for congressional access to open 
investigations. Matthew Miller, the former Department of Justice 
spokesperson under President Obama, stated: “This cave by DOJ will 
have long-lasting ramifications. This is an area governed solely by 
precedent, and DOJ is setting precedent that it is ok for Congress to 
interfere with, and receive documents pertaining to, active 
investigations.”190 Former U.S. Attorney and Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Harry Litman wrote in the Washington Post: “This 
capitulation alters the balance of power between the Justice 
Department and the Hill and makes it substantially more difficult for 
 
 184. Mazzetti, supra note 1.  
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Matthew Miller (@matthewamiller), TWITTER (Apr. 19, 2018, 11:49 AM), 
https://twitter.com/matthewamiller/status/987040540968521728. 
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department officials to resist future congressional interference in 
active, politically charged investigations.”191 
Given the circumstances of these disclosures, however, they should 
hardly be given any precedential weight in future confrontations 
between Congress and the Department of Justice. The earlier 
conflicts192 were clear adversarial battles between the two branches in 
which Congress sought criminal investigatory materials and the 
Executive zealously sought to protect its constitutional prerogatives. 
This was a case in which the President was openly pressuring the 
Department to disclose the material because it was in his own self-
interest to discover information to aid in his defense of the Mueller 
investigation. In essence, the President was colluding with the House 
Committee to obtain backdoor discovery about the investigation. The 
political alignment of the President and the House Committee 
prompted the two branches to ignore their typical institutional roles. 
Given the conflict of interest between the President’s desire for 
information about his own case and the institutional interests of the 
Department of Justice, this incident hardly represents a legitimate 
precedent for future congressional investigative demands for records 
from open criminal cases. 
Indeed, because of the conflict of interest, the case presents a 
perfect example of the potential harms of disclosures from open cases. 
As former Senator Carl Levin wrote, 
How dangerous is the assault by House Republicans on the special 
counsel investigation by Robert Mueller? In terms of the operation 
of our system of government, it is very dangerous indeed. There is 
an ongoing investigation into Russian influence in the 2016 election. 
While Donald Trump is apparently not a target, his campaign and 
some of his top campaign officials are. This is a criminal 
investigation in which President Trump has a deep and personal 
interest.193 
Given the circumstances, it is appropriate to recall the warning of 
Attorney General Robert Jackson, who wrote: 
Disclosure of the reports could not do otherwise than seriously 
prejudice law enforcement. Counsel for a defendant or prospective 
 
 191. Harry Litman, Rod Rosenstein Has Made Two Critical Missteps, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rod-rosenstein-has-made-two-critical-missteps/ 
2018/04/23/4bd9c740-4689-11e8-9072-f6d4bc32f223_story.html?utm_term=.c77a1ed935f3.  
 192. See supra Parts III.C.1–3.  
 193. Levin, supra note 101. 
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defendant, could have no greater help than to know how much or 
how little information the government has, and what witnesses or 
sources of information it can rely upon. This is exactly what these 
reports are intended to contain.194 
President Trump sought the material for precisely those reasons, and 
thus became exhibit A for the case against disclosure of open criminal 
investigative files. 
5. The Conclusions that We May Draw from the Historical Record 
The historical record makes it clear that Congress has conducted 
oversight of the Department of Justice on many occasions. Most of 
these investigations involved allegations of investigative or 
prosecutorial misconduct by Department officials. Many of the 
investigations did not require disclosure of pre-decisional deliberative 
material from the Department’s criminal files. On a number of 
occasions, however, Congress has obtained such deliberative material 
from closed files, in spite of the Department’s reluctance to disclose 
such records. In the face of a congressional subpoena, the Department 
has withheld such material only if the material was protected by Rule 
6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure195 or if the President 
asserted a claim of executive privilege. 
On the other hand, there is little precedent for Congress demanding 
material contained in open criminal investigative files, and there are 
even fewer examples of the Department of Justice actually producing 
such documents. This precedent is particularly significant because so 
many executive privilege disputes with Congress are resolved on the 
basis of the perceived legitimacy of each branch’s claim based on past 
practice. Based on the potential for improper congressional influence 
over the decision to prosecute a particular individual, Congress should 
not conduct oversight of open criminal investigations. 
D. Conclusions about Prosecutorial Independence from the Legislative 
Branch 
The Constitution excludes Congress from any involvement in 
prosecutorial decisions in individual cases even more forcefully than it 
excludes the judiciary. Not only may Congress not give itself the power 
 
 194. Jackson, supra note 103.   
 195. The rule requires those who are part of the grand jury proceeding to “not disclose a 
matter occurring before the grand jury,” including the grand jurors and the government attorney. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).  
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to appoint or control a prosecutor in ordinary cases, it may not do so 
even in cases involving criminal contempt of Congress. Moreover, the 
constitutional concern about the influence of congressional politics is 
so significant that Congress is constitutionally barred from oversight of 
open criminal investigations. These rules are not designed to protect 
the President’s constitutional prerogatives; they are designed to protect 
the three-step process of federal criminal prosecution from political 
influence and unfairness to those who are subject to criminal 
investigation and prosecution. The Constitution requires federal 
prosecutorial independence from congressional interference in order 
to protect individual liberty and preserve the integrity of the criminal 
justice system. 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 
Notwithstanding the President’s constitutional authority to manage 
the executive branch, there are important norms that prevent the White 
House from intervening in individual criminal cases. This section 
explores those norms by first discussing the reasons for the norms and 
the historic commitment to the separation of political influence from 
prosecutorial decision-making. The section then recounts how this 
decades-old principle suffered a serious blow during the Nixon 
Administration, only to bounce back and be reinvigorated by a 
succession of Attorneys General who were sensitive to the need for 
integrity in the federal criminal justice system. The section concludes 
with an analysis of the instances in which President Trump has 
repeatedly violated those norms in ways that cast doubt on the integrity 
of the criminal investigation process. 
A. The Strong Policy Against White House Involvement in Individual 
Prosecutions 
The President has the power to “nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, appoint,”196 and remove at will all 
of the top officials at the Department of Justice, including the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney 
General, the Solicitor General, all the Assistant Attorneys General who 
head the individual divisions within the Department of Justice, and the 
 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  11:55 AM 
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15 
United States Attorneys.197 This power does not mean, however, that 
the President has the absolute right to intervene in decisions about 
individual cases or investigations.198 There are important issues of 
federal prosecutorial independence within the executive branch that 
relate to laws or policies that insulate federal prosecutors from 
influence by the president or others within the White House. As 
President Obama wrote in the Harvard Law Review, 
Even at the federal level, there are important limits on the 
president’s authority . . . . Nowhere are these limits more important 
than in the administration of the criminal law. For good reason, 
particular criminal matters are not directed by the President 
personally but are handled by career prosecutors and law 
enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the public and 
promoting public safety. The President does not and should not 
decide who or what to investigate or prosecute or when an 
investigation or prosecution should happen.199 
This insulation of federal prosecutors from political direction from the 
White House in individual cases or investigations is founded on the 
same principles that prevent congressional influence over specific 
cases. Of course, the White House must be able to discuss general 
prosecutorial policy and other matters of general Department 
administration, but White House discussions with line prosecutors 
delegitimize the prosecutorial process by raising the risk of politically 
motivated decisions. For this reason, there have long been strict policies 
regulating White House contact with the Department of Justice for at 
least the last 80 years.200 
 
 197. See 28 U.S.C. § 541(b)–(c) (2018) (“Each United States Attorney is subject to removal 
by the President.”); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 n.34 (1988) (noting that U.S. 
Attorneys are appointed by the president and “subject to termination at will”).  
 198. Contra Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:33 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1228311415192215553 (remarking that, when it 
comes to intervening in criminal cases, he has “the legal right to do so”); Kevin Liptak, Trump 
Says He Didn’t Ask Justice Department to Change Stone Sentencing Recommendations, CNN 
(Feb. 11, 2020, 5:33 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/11/politics/donald-trump-roger-stone-
justice-department/index.html (President Trump declaring that he has “stay[ed] out of [criminal 
cases] to a degree that people wouldn’t believe” but asserted that “I’d be able to do it if I wanted, 
I have the absolute right to do it”). 
 199. Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice 
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
 200. Scholars have debated the significance of the historical record prior to 1940. Several 
scholars have argued that, in the early years of the republic, prosecutions of federal crimes were 
largely independent of any centralized control. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the 
Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 561, 585–86; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: 
Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989) (“From an early period, Congress 
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These intra-branch issues deal with two different types of 
prosecutorial independence. First, a specially appointed prosecutor 
may be protected from removal in order to avoid a conflict of interest 
when the prosecutor is investigating potential criminal wrongdoing by 
the president or his close associates. Second, statutes or strong policy 
norms may insulate federal prosecutors, including U.S. Attorneys, from 
direct contact with the president or others in the White House to 
protect against the appearance that investigations or prosecutions have 
been initiated because of political influence. 
Although the president is the sole head of the executive branch and 
has the constitutional right to supervise subordinates within the 
executive branch,201 there have traditionally been strong policy norms 
forbidding White House involvement in the initiation of particular 
criminal investigations or prosecutions. Attorney General Robert 
Jackson identified “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that 
he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases 
that need to be prosecuted.”202 He noted: 
 
limited the Executive’s effective control over criminal law enforcement ‘affirmatively’ by 
dispersing supervisory responsibility among various executive officials.”). Others have disagreed. 
For example, Presidents have not always abstained from involvement in individual investigations 
or prosecutions. Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued that “[h]istorical claims . . . about the 
insulation of federal prosecution from presidential control are largely wrong.” Saikrishna 
Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526 (2005) (“Presidents Washington, 
Adams, and Jefferson believed that they had constitutional authority to direct federal district 
attorneys. In fact, each directed district attorneys to begin and cease prosecutions in . . . cases 
suffused with foreign affairs implications, cases involving the domestic political opposition, and 
even cases concerning the nation’s territorial integrity.”). Professor Prakash, cites, among 
instances, President Washington’s decision to order prosecution of the participants in the 
Whiskey Rebellion and President John Adams’s control over prosecutions against his political 
enemies under the Sedition of Act of 1798. Id. at 555–65. Attorney General Roger B. Taney 
authored a legal opinion in 1831 in which he concluded that a president had the power to direct a 
federal district attorney to discontinue a civil forfeiture case. See Kate Andrias, The President’s 
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1050–54 (2013). Professors Green and Roiphe 
conclude, with respect to the early history, “[t]he early history might suggest an intermediate 
position. Although the early presidential involvement in criminal prosecution was justified as an 
exercise of authority to ‘take care’ that federal laws are faithfully exercised, most of the reported 
examples seem to implicate other presidential powers and, in particular, the power to conduct 
foreign affairs. One might argue that, rather than possessing plenary authority over criminal 
prosecutions, presidents could supersede ordinary prosecutorial independence only in cases 
where enumerated presidential powers were implicated.” See Green & Roiphe, supra note 1, at 
15; see id. at 38–69 (providing a thorough history of the 18th and 19th century history of 
presidential involvement in prosecutions). 
 201. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (asserting that the President has the 
power to “supervise and guide” his subordinates in “their construction of the statutes under which 
they act”).  
 202. Robert H. Jackson, “The Federal Prosecutor” An Address by Robert H. Jackson, 
Attorney General, Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys, 1, 4 (Apr. 1, 1940, 
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The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation 
than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He 
can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he 
can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or 
unveiled intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle 
course and simply have a citizen’s friends interviewed. The 
prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret 
session, and on the basis of this one-sided presentation of the facts, 
can cause a citizen to be indicted and held for trial.203 
The danger is that, if a prosecutor targets, or is told to target, a 
particular person, 
[i]t is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and 
then looking for the man who committed it, it is a question of 
picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting 
investigators to work to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm—
in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or 
desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons 
and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of 
prosecuting power lies.204 
Given this power, there is a unique danger in allowing the president 
or his political operatives within the White House to press federal 
prosecutors to investigate particular persons or groups. Unfortunately, 
notwithstanding the general principle that politics should not influence 
individual prosecutions, there have been times when the White House 
has attempted to use federal prosecutor power for political ends. For 
example, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate and 
report on civil rights groups and anti-Vietnam war groups for political 
reasons.205 President Richard Nixon used the Department of Justice 
even more aggressively to investigate political opponents, including 
members of Congress and journalists.206 Both Attorney General John 
Mitchell and his successor, Richard Kleindienst, allowed the 
Department of Justice to be used for political purposes and as a tool to 
advance presidential power.207 
 
10:00 AM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/16/04-01-1940.pdf. 
 203. Id. at 1. 
 204. Id. at 5. 
 205. See ATHAN THEOHARIS, THE FBI AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A BRIEF CRITICAL 
HISTORY 126–27 (2004). 
 206. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD 
NIXON 180, 233, 367 (1990); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 256–57 
(1973). 
 207. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE, 1789–1990, 120–21 (1992). 
PETERSON FORMATTED 4.9 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020  11:55 AM 
2020] FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE 265 
The Nixon White House not only utilized the Department of Justice 
to threaten opponents, but it also intervened on numerous occasions to 
halt or interfere with investigations of potential wrongdoing by the 
White House. After resigning as President Nixon’s first Attorney 
General, John Mitchell became the head of President Nixon’s re-
election campaign.208 Mitchell approved the plans for illegal electronic 
surveillance of the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters at 
the Watergate Hotel as well as other illegal campaign activities 
suggested by the White House and other campaign officials.209 After the 
police arrested the operatives who attempted to break into the DNC 
headquarters, the FBI opened an investigation under the federal 
criminal statutes that banned unauthorized wiretaps.210 At that point, 
John Ehrlichman, one of President Nixon’s chief White House aides, 
called the FBI and told them, “I have a mandate from the President of 
the United States . . . the FBI is to terminate the investigation of the 
break-in.”211 When the FBI official who took Ehrlichman’s call refused 
to close the investigation, Ehrlichman threatened to “doom the FBI 
official’s career.”212 When that effort failed to halt the investigation, 
President Nixon asked a senior CIA official to inform the FBI that 
national security would be compromised if the FBI did not end the 
investigation of the Watergate break-in.213 
Throughout the FBI’s initial investigation of the Watergate break-
in, the Department of Justice briefed the White House counsel on the 
investigation and kept the White House informed of the results of the 
investigation and the grand jury’s proceedings.214 Finally, and most 
infamously, President Nixon ultimately ordered the Attorney General 
to fire Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor in charge of the Watergate 
investigation.215 Attorney General Elliott Richardson and Deputy 
Attorney General William Ruckelshaus each resigned rather than 
 
 208. Id. at 120–23. 
 209. Id. at 122–25. 
 210. Id. at 126. 
 211. TIM WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE FBI 309 (2012).  
 212. Id. at 309–10. 
 213. Id. at 310–11. 
 214. KEITH W. OLSON, WATERGATE: THE PRESIDENTIAL SCANDAL THAT SHOOK 
AMERICA 58 (2016). 
 215. Neil A. Lewis, Elliott Richardson Dies at 79; Stood Up to Nixon and Resigned in 
“Saturday Night Massacre”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 1, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/01/us/ 
elliot-richardson-dies-79-stood-up-nixon-resigned-saturday-night-massacre.html. 
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comply with the President’s order to fire the special prosecutor.216  
Ultimately, the firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox generated so 
much controversy that Acting Attorney General Robert Bork 
appointed Leon Jaworski as the new Special Prosecutor to investigate 
crimes related to the Watergate break-in.217 
B. The Implementation and Evolution of Post-Nixon DOJ Policies to 
Maintain Prosecutorial Independence 
In the wake of President Nixon’s resignation, Congress enacted a 
multitude of statutes to limit the ability of the White House to misuse 
the Department of Justice. These statutes included the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act,218 the Ethics in Government Act,219 and 
the Inspector General Act.220 
Subsequent Attorneys General took actions that were equally 
significant. For example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi 
adopted guidelines for FBI investigations in order to prevent the kinds 
of abuses that had occurred during the Nixon years and the tenure of J. 
Edgar Hoover as head of the FBI.221 Two years later, Attorney General 
Griffin Bell adopted strict guidelines governing communications 
between the White House and Department of Justice officials.222 He 
acknowledged that “the partisan activities of some Attorneys General 
in this century combined with the unfortunate legacy of Watergate, 
have given rise to an understandable public concern that some 
 
 216. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox: Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 1, 1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/ 
articles/102173-2.htm.  
 217. Kenneth B. Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis on His Role in Watergate, N.Y. TIMES (July 
2, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/02/us/bork-irked-by-emphasis-on-his-role-in-water 
gate.html. 
 218. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-4511, 92 Stat. 1783 (providing 
procedures the government needs to follow before surveilling American citizens and providing 
congressional and judicial oversight over such surveillance).  
 219. Ethics and Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (requiring public 
disclosure of financial information for public officials and setting the procedures that would 
trigger the appointment of a special counsel). 
 220. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101, codified as amended at            
5 U.S.C. App. § 1 et. seq (creating Inspector General positions for various departments and 
agencies, including the Department of Justice, that have the authority to review internal 
documents and investigate, inter alia, fraud).  
 221. See John T. Eliff, Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 785, 796–97, 798–99 (1984) (outlining the threshold requirements before opening up 
domestic security investigations).  
 222. Griffin B. Bell., An Address by The Honorable Griffin B. Bell Attorney General of the 
United States, (Sept. 6, 1978, 11:00 AM), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/ 
08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf.  
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decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or pressure, or 
politics.”223 
In order to remedy this concern, Attorney General Bell stated that 
the primary responsibility for exercising prosecutorial discretion within 
the Department had been assigned to the Assistant Attorneys General 
in charge of each division.224 Of course, an Assistant Attorney General 
would be permitted to consult with the Attorney General, the Deputy 
Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General, “but it is the 
Assistant Attorney General’s responsibility to reach a decision in the 
first instance.”225 In particular, because “Assistant Attorneys General 
must be insulated from influences that should not affect decisions in 
particular criminal or civil cases[,] . . . all communications about 
particular cases, from members of Congress or their staffs, or members 
of the White House staff, should be referred to my office, or the offices 
of the Deputy or the Associate Attorney General. It will be our job to 
screen these communications to ensure that any improper attempts to 
influence a decision do not reach the Assistant Attorney General.”226 
Attorney General Bell captured the essence of the potential problems 
that could arise from contacts between the White House (or Congress) 
with DOJ officials charged with prosecutorial decisions: “[T]he 
problem is that their positions of power create a potential for 
unintentional influence upon a decision, and they give rise to the 
appearance of improper influence.”227 
Attorney General Bell continued, “it is improper for any member 
of Congress, any member of the White House staff, or anyone else, to 
attempt to influence anyone in the Justice Department with respect to 
a particular litigation decision, except by legal arguments or the 
provision of relevant facts. This principle is essential to our proper 
function, because litigation decisions are frequently discretionary.”228 
Attorney General Bell concluded that, after the unfortunate events of 
the Watergate era, the Department “may now be in the position to 
establish firmly the tradition that the Attorney General and the lawyers 
under him must be free from outside interference in reaching 
professional judgments on legal matters. We must do everything that 
 
 223. Id. at 3. 
 224. Id. at 6–7. 
 225. Id. at 7. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 7–8. 
 228. Id. at 9. 
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we can, in our time, to help establish and reinforce such a tradition. I 
firmly believe that the procedures and principles I have prescribed are 
a long, important step toward that crucial goal.”229 Attorney General 
Bell also stated, “the U.S. Attorneys are under these rules just as much 
as anyone else.”230 
Attorney General Bell’s remarks reflected a general consensus in 
the post-Watergate era that prosecutorial decisions at the Department 
of Justice should be insulated from both actual and apparent influence 
from the White House and Congress.231 The President and officials in 
the White House, however, must necessarily and properly 
communicate with the Attorney General to establish enforcement 
priorities and general Department of Justice policy.232 However, after 
Watergate, scholars and politicians agreed that the Department of 
Justice should never be used for partisan political purposes, personal 
vendettas, or corrupt self-dealing, that the senior leaders of the 
Department should play no role in electoral campaigns, and that the 
Department should not engage in the collection of partisan political 
information.233 
Attorney General Bell’s Policy was reaffirmed by his successor, 
Benjamin R. Civiletti, in a memorandum he issued to the heads of all 
offices, boards, bureaus and divisions of the Department of Justice.234 
Attorney General Civiletti stated that, as a general principle, the 
officials with primary responsibility to initiate and supervise 
prosecutions 
 
 229. Id. at 12–13. 
 230. Id. at 21. 
 231. See, e.g., PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 37–38 (1976) (arguing that “the Attorney General 
should remain a loyal member of the Cabinet backed up by a highly competent and impartial core 
of attorneys” and that the DOJ should be “divorced from partisan politics”).  
 232. For instance, Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, Robert G. Dixon, gave this 
explanation justifying the necessary role the President plays in setting Department priorities: 
The people of the country are properly concerned about matters such as organized 
crime, civil rights, pornography, the death penalty, and enforcement of the antitrust 
laws. These and other areas are legitimate issues of public interest in a presidential 
campaign. The President should be able to set broad priorities in these and related 
areas . . . . 
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. at 16. (1974). 
 233. Kent, supra note 1, at 1943.  
 234. Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Heads of Offices, Boards, Bureaus and 
Divisions (Oct. 18, 1979), www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/Civiletti/1979/10-18-1979.pdf. 
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must be insulated from influences that should not affect decisions 
in particular criminal or civil cases. To ensure that this occurs, to 
continue the independence of the Department of Justice, to prevent 
even the appearance of conflicts of interest and to provide for the 
most efficient and effective system of proper communications with 
outside parties, we must provide for specific procedures to regulate 
communication concerning pending cases.235 
To implement this policy, Attorney General Civiletti directed that 
any communications from the White House or Congress concerning a 
pending case should be directed only to the offices of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General or the Associate Attorney 
General.236 The memorandum also directed that any request for formal 
legal advice or legal opinions should be directed to the Office of the 
Attorney General or OLC.237 In addition, Civiletti limited the people in 
the White House who could contact the Department of Justice to either 
the head of the Domestic Policy Staff or the Counsel to the President.238 
The policy also permitted the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs to raise matters relating to intelligence and national 
security.239 Attorney General Civiletti concluded by stating: “We at 
Justice are not infallible, but the responsibility for wielding our power 
fairly is ours alone. Criticism after the fact is perfectly proper. Criticism 
before the fact must be channeled so that fairness is not defeated, and 
justice is served.”240 
Although Attorney General Civiletti’s policy remained in effect 
during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations, it was 
significantly relaxed during the George W. Bush administration. In 
2007, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted in a report that, “by 
adding the Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, 
President, Vice President, White House Counsel, National Security 
Council, and Homeland Security, in their entireties, the new Bush 
Administration policy241 permitted at least 417 people in the White 
House to communicate with at least 42 people at the Department on 
 
 235. Id. at 1.  
 236. Id. at 1–2. 
 237. Id. at 2.  
 238. Id. at 2–3. 
 239. Id. at 3.  
 240. Id. at 4. 
 241. This policy, issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft, expanded the list of people in 
various offices in the White House who may communicate with certain members of the 
Department of Justice regarding matters including pending criminal investigations. S. Rep. No. 
110-203, at 15–16 (Appendix B).  
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non-National Security related matters.”242 The same Senate report 
noted that in May of 2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued 
a new policy that “permits at least 895 people in the Executive Branch 
to communicate with at least 42 people at the Department on non-
National Security related matters.”243 
Perhaps not coincidentally, during Attorney General Gonzalez’s 
tenure the Department of Justice suffered the worst threat to 
prosecutorial independence since Watergate. Attorney General 
Gonzalez abruptly fired nine United States Attorneys at one time 
because of alleged performance issues.244 As the DOJ Inspector 
General later reported: “The way the Department handled the removal 
of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, and the after-the-fact reasons proffered 
for this, resulted in significant controversy, concerns that the removals 
were undertaken for improper political purposes and allegations that 
the reasons proffered by the Department for the removals were not 
accurate.”245 After a lengthy investigation that resulted in a report of 
well over 350 pages, the Inspector General concluded that its 
investigation found significant evidence that political partisan 
considerations were an important factor in the removal of several of 
the U.S. Attorneys.246 In what the Inspector General characterized as 
the “most troubling example,” the report found that the United States 
Attorney for the District of New Mexico was removed because of 
“complaints from New Mexico Republican politicians and party 
activists about [the U.S. Attorney’s] handling of voter fraud and 
corruption cases . . . and that the Department removed the U.S. 
Attorney without any inquiry into his handling of the cases.”247 The 
controversy over these firings led to a congressional investigation and 
disputed claims of executive privilege, which then led to a congressional 
lawsuit seeking production of White House documents and testimony 
from two White House officials.248 The U.S. Attorney firings seriously 
 
 242. Id. at 2–3. 
 243. Id. at 3. 
 244. David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 710 & n.11 
(2007); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of 
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 187–88 (2008). 
 245. U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 325 (2008).  
 246. Id. at 325–58 (analyzing the process used in terminating the nine U.S. Attorneys and 
concluded, based on the findings of fact, that the reasons justifying their removal were “based on 
improper political factors” and that “political partisan considerations were an important factor in 
the removal of several of the U.S. Attorneys”).  
 247. Id. at 326. 
 248. See Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 106–07 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that 
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damaged the credibility of the Department and ultimately contributed 
to the departure of Attorney General Gonzales.249 
Michael Mukasey, the successor to Attorney General Gonzales, 
issued a revised memorandum covering communications between the 
White House and the Department of Justice.250 Attorney General 
Mukasey’s memorandum argued that on “many subjects, the White 
House and the Department must be able to communicate freely in 
order to carry out efficiently the administration’s policies and 
programs.”251 As a result, “all communications between the 
Department and the White House that concern policy, legislation, 
budgeting, political appointments, personnel matters related to 
political appointees, public affairs, informal legal opinions, 
intergovernmental relations, administrative matters, or similar matters 
may be handled directly by the parties concerned.”252 The 
memorandum cautioned that 
[c]ommunications with respect to pending criminal or civil-
enforcement matters, however, must be limited. Therefore, the 
Department will advise the White House about such criminal or 
civil-enforcement matters only when it is important for the 
President’s duties and where appropriate from a law enforcement 
perspective. This limitation recognizes the President’s ability to 
perform his obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed” while ensuring that there is public confidence that the 
laws of the United States are administered and enforced in an 
impartial manner.253  
In order to implement this principle, the memorandum directed 
that, on non-national security related matters regarding any specific 
pending Department investigation or criminal or civil-enforcement 
matter, “communications between the Department and the White 
House should be limited to the Counsel to the President or Deputy 
Counsel and the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.”254 
 
former White House Counsel was not entitled to absolute immunity from testifying before 
Congress). 
 249. See Steven Lee Myers and Philip Shenon, Embattled Attorney General Resigns, N.Y. 
TIMES, August 27, 2007, at 1.  
 250. Memorandum from Attorney General Michael Mukasey for Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys (Dec. 19, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/ag/legacy/2008/04/15/ag-121907.pdf.  
 251. Id. at 1.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. at 1–2. 
 254. Id. at 2.  
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The Associate Attorney General could communicate regarding civil-
enforcement matters, and the Solicitor General could communicate on 
matters relating to appeals.255 
After the election of President Obama, Attorney General Eric 
Holder issued a much more detailed memorandum governing 
communications with the White House and Congress.256 That 
memorandum stated that the 
Assistant Attorneys General, the United States Attorneys, and the 
heads of investigative agencies in the Department have the primary 
responsibility to initiate and supervise investigations and cases. 
These officials, like their superiors and their subordinates, must be 
insulated from influences that should not affect decisions in 
particular criminal or civil cases.257  
Attorney General Holder cited the Supreme Court in determining that 
those who exercise the Department’s investigatory and prosecutorial 
powers are representatives “not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereign whose obligation to government impartiality is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done.”258 
The memorandum required that initial communications between 
the Department and the White House regarding pending or future 
criminal investigations or cases would include only the Attorney 
General or Deputy Attorney General and the Counsel to the President, 
the principal Deputy Counsel to the President, the President, or the 
Vice President.259 The memorandum permitted the Associate Attorney 
General also to be involved with communications concerning a 
pending or contemplated civil investigation or case.260 If continuing 
contact between the Department of Justice and the White House would 
be required, then the officials involved in the initial communication 
could designate subordinates to carry on this contact, but those officials 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder for Heads of Department 
Components, All United States Attorneys, at 1 (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-
library/communications_with_the_white_house_and_congress_2009.pdf/download.  
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 259. Id. at 2. 
 260. Id. at 2.  
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were required to keep their superiors regularly informed of such 
contacts.261 
With respect to congressional inquiries, the memorandum required 
that any communications from individual senators or members of 
Congress or their staffs should be directed only to the Attorney 
General or Deputy Attorney General in the case of criminal 
investigations and the Associate Attorney General in the case of civil 
investigations or cases.262 Moreover, the memorandum also limited 
communications with respect to personnel decisions regarding 
positions in the civil service.263 In such matters, “communications 
regarding positions in the career service are not proper when they 
concern a job applicant’s or a job holder’s partisan affiliation. Efforts 
to influence personnel decisions concerning career positions on 
partisan grounds should be reported to the Deputy Attorney 
General.”264 
C. The Trump Administration’s Disregard of DOJ Precedent 
One week after President Trump’s inauguration, his White House 
Counsel, Donald F. McGahn, wrote a memorandum to all White House 
staff concerning communications restrictions with personnel at the 
Department of Justice.265 The memorandum stated that the DOJ 
advises the White House about contemplated or pending investigations 
or enforcement actions under specific guidelines issued by the 
Attorney General and that “[a]s a general matter, only the President, 
Vice President, Counsel to the President, and Deputy Counsel to the 
President may be involved in such communications. These individuals 
may designate subordinates to engage in ongoing contacts about a 
particular matter with counterparts at DOJ similarly designated by 
DOJ.”266 The memorandum further required that “[c]ommunications 
with DOJ about individual cases or investigations should be routed 
through the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate 
Attorney General, or Solicitor General, unless the Counsel’s office 
 
 261. Id.  
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 3. 
 264. Id. at 3. 
 265. Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II to All White House Staff, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000.  
 266. Id.  
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approves different procedures for the specific case at issue.”267 
Moreover,  
[t]he President, the Vice President, Counsel to the President, and 
Deputy Counsel to the President are the only White House officials 
who may initiate a conversation with DOJ about a specific case or 
investigation. These rules recognize the president’s constitutional 
obligation to take care that the laws of the United States are 
faithfully executed, while insuring maximum public confidence that 
those laws are administered and applied impartially in individual 
investigations or cases.268 
Notwithstanding this apparent continuation of the policies set forth in 
Attorney General Holder’s Memorandum, the Trump White House 
quickly began to honor these restrictions in the breach.269 
For example, the New York Times reported that White House 
Counsel Donald McGahn “was working to secure access to what Mr. 
McGahn believed to be an order issued by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court authorizing some form of surveillance relating to 
Mr. Trump and his associates.”270 Moreover, individuals in the White 
House apparently asked the FBI to refute reports that Trump campaign 
advisors had contact with Russia during the presidential campaign.271 
In addition, the New York Daily News reported that White House 
Senior Advisor Stephen Miller called the home of the U.S. Attorney for 
the Eastern District of New York to give instructions on how he should 
defend the Administration’s travel ban.272 
Moreover, President Trump has violated the spirit of the policies 
regarding White House contacts with the Department of Justice in the 
numerous public statements in which he has called for the 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 1–2. 
 269. See White House Communications with the DOJ and FBI, PROTECT DEMOCRACY (Mar. 
8, 2017), https://protectdemocracy.org/agencycontacts/ (describing examples of the Trump 
Administration’s breach of longstanding bipartisan policies limiting contacts between the White 
House and the DOJ).  
 270. Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump, Offering No Evidence, Says Obama 
Tapped His Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/us/politics/ 
trump-obama-tap-phones.html. 
 271. Spencer Ackerman, White House Confirms Conversation with FBI About Trump and 
Russia, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/24/ 
donald-trump-russia-reince-priebus-fbi-talks-james-comey. 
 272. Harry Siegel, Stephen Miller Called Brooklyn U.S. Attorney at Home and Told Them 
How to Defend Travel Ban in Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.nydailynews. 
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investigation, indictment, or prosecution of various individuals.273 
President Trump, in the face of criticism of his frequent 
pronouncements, asserted, “I have the absolute right to do what I want 
with the Justice Department.”274 As one scholar observed, 
President Trump has made unorthodox private contacts with 
Department officials with responsibility for criminal investigations 
touching on his interests; publicly criticized senior department 
officials for prosecutorial and investigative judgments; and accused 
former officials including his predecessor, of politically motivated 
surveillance and criminal conduct. All of these comments will be 
heard by the FBI and others in the Department conducting 
investigations touching on President Trump’s personal and political 
interests. It exacerbates an already charged political climate that 
presents challenges to the exercise of independent professional 
judgment on the part of law enforcement and prosecutors.275 
President Trump’s communications and comments have related 
both to potential investigations of political opponents and to 
investigations of himself and his political allies. In the first category, he 
renewed his campaign demands for reopening the criminal 
investigation of Hilary Clinton’s email use.276 President Trump also 
demanded investigations of his opponent’s connections to a 
controversial uranium deal and Democratic payments for the so-called 
“Steele dossier” which included reports of Russian collusion with the 
Trump campaign and other controversial allegations against President 
Trump.277 He later wondered when the Department would “act” to 
 
 273. See Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Wanted to Order Justice Dept. to 
Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/20/us/politics/president-trump-justice-department.html (describing how the President 
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for “mishandling sensitive government information and for his role in the Clinton email 
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POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2017, 7:56 AM), https://www.politico.com/stories/2017/11/03/trump-doj-
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prosecute Hillary Clinton’s former aide, Huma Abedin.278 The Mueller 
Report found that President Trump “pushed back on the DOJ contacts 
policy, and said words to the effect of, ‘You’re telling me that Bobby 
and Jack didn’t talk about investigations? Or Obama didn’t tell Eric 
Holder who to investigate?’”279 In addition, the Report found that the 
President later called Attorney General Jeff Sessions at home and 
“asked if Sessions would ‘unrecuse’ [sic] himself. According to Sessions, 
the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could 
direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary 
Clinton . . . .”280 The President renewed his request that Sessions 
investigate Hillary Clinton later in 2017.281 At that time, “the President 
met privately with Sessions and said that the Department of Justice was 
not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the 
Department should be investigating.”282 According to notes taken at 
the meeting, “the President mentioned Clinton’s emails and said, 
“Don’t tell us, just take [a] look.”283 
In the second category, communications and comments relating to 
investigations involving President Trump or his associates, President 
Trump has attempted to influence the course of those investigations 
both publicly and privately. Publicly, the President frequently expressed 
his ire over both Robert Mueller’s independent counsel investigation 
of Russian interference with the 2016 presidential election and the 
investigation by the United States Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York into hush payments made by President Trump’s former 
attorney, Michael Cohen, to women who had extramarital affairs with 
 
made Fake Dossier (now $12 million).” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 
29, 2017, 6:53 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/924635359480303616?lang=en; 
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7:17 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/924641278947622913?lang=en. 
 278. David Nakamura & Matt Zapotosky, Trump Urges Justice Department to “Act” on 
Comey, Suggests Huma Abedin Should Face Jail Time, WASH. POST. (Jan. 2, 2018), 
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Donald Trump.284 For example, he made numerous public criticisms of 
the Mueller investigation, which he repeatedly called a politically 
motivated “witch hunt.”285 As CNN noted, President Trump “has used 
the ‘Russia-hoax’ label at least once a month since March.”286 
The President also acted outside of the public’s view. The New York 
Times published an extensive review of President Trump’s efforts to 
oppose and obstruct the various investigations of potential criminal 
behavior in his administration.287 The Times noted that its investigation 
revealed “the extent of an even more sustained, more secretive assault 
by Mr. Trump on the machinery of federal law enforcement. Interviews 
with dozens of current and former government officials and others 
close to Mr. Trump, as well as a review of confidential White House 
documents, reveal numerous unreported episodes in a two-year 
drama.” As the Times further reported: 
The story of Mr. Trump’s attempt to defang the investigations has 
been voluminously covered in the news media, to such a degree that 
many Americans have lost track of how unusual his behavior is. But 
fusing the strands reveals an extraordinary story of a president who 
has attacked the law enforcement apparatus of his own government 
like no other president in history, and who has turned the effort into 
an obsession.288 
The Mueller Report confirmed the Times story and detailed 
additional presidential efforts to restrict or terminate the Russia 
investigation. The Mueller report cataloged these actions in over 140 
pages of detailed factual findings, which will here be only briefly 
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summarized.289 The Report notes that in January of 2017, the President 
asked FBI Director James Comey to dinner at the White House and 
that when Comey arrived, “he was surprised and concerned to see that 
no one else had been invited.”290 During the dinner, the President made 
comments that Comey interpreted to be “an effort to create a 
patronage relationship by having Comey ask for his job.”291 Later, the 
President stated to Comey, “I need loyalty, I expect loyalty.”292 A few 
weeks later in February, the President cleared the Oval Office after a 
meeting in order to speak privately with Director Comey.293 Once he 
was alone with Comey, the President brought up the investigation of 
then-National Security Director Michael Flynn. The President said to 
Comey that Flynn “is a good guy and has been through a lot . . . I hope 
you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a 
good guy. I hope you can let this go.”294 The Mueller Report notes that 
Comey testified under oath that he took the President’s statement “‘as 
a direction’ because of the President’s position and the circumstances 
of the one-on-one meeting.”295 
The Report also recounts President Trump’s efforts to get Director 
Comey to “lift the cloud” created by the Russia investigation,296 by 
which he meant that Comey should—in Comey’s words—“find a way 
to get out that we weren’t investigating him.”297 When the President 
called Comey to follow up on this conversation, Comey said that he 
had passed the President’s request along to senior DOJ officials and 
“he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a 
request would be to have the White House Counsel contact DOJ 
leadership.”298 
The events leading up to the termination of FBI Director Comey 
give further examples of the President’s efforts to influence the 
investigation and the public’s perception of it. Before Comey’s 
testimony at a Senate oversight hearing, the President “said it would be 
the last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record 
straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under 
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investigation.”299 After Comey declined to answer questions about the 
Russia investigation, the “President became very upset and directed his 
anger at [Attorney General] Sessions.”300 According to notes taken by 
the Attorney General’s chief of staff, the President said: “This is terrible 
Jeff. It’s all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important 
appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed 
Holder. I appointed you and you recused yourself. You left me on an 
island. I can’t do anything.”301 By the next weekend, the President had 
decided to fire Comey.302 The President wanted to include in the letter 
firing Comey the fact that Comey had refused to state that the 
President himself was not under investigation.303 
After Comey’s dismissal, the White House asked the Department 
of Justice to put out a statement that it was Deputy Attorney General 
Rosenstein’s idea to fire Comey.304 Rosenstein declined to put out a 
“false story” and told the President that it would not be a good idea for 
Rosenstein to hold a press conference because he “would tell the truth 
that Comey’s firing was not his idea.”305 Notwithstanding Rosenstein’s 
comments, the White House press secretary told reporters, “[i]t was all 
[Rosenstein]. No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision.”306 
The next day, in an Oval Office meeting with the Russian Foreign 
Minister and the Russian Ambassador, the President said, “I just fired 
the head of the F.B.I. He was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure 
because of Russia. That’s taken off . . . . I’m not under investigation.”307 
After repeated false statements by the White House press office about 
who initiated Comey’s termination, the President admitted in an 
interview that he had already made up his mind to fire Comey and 
continued: “And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself – 
I said, you know this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up 
story. It’s an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that 
they should’ve won.”308 
In discussing the facts relating to Comey’s firing, the Mueller 
Report noted: “Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the 
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President’s decision to fire Comey was Comey’s unwillingness to 
publicly state that the President was not personally under investigation, 
despite the President’s repeated requests that Comey make such an 
announcement.”309 Moreover, the Report added, “[t]he President also 
said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General ‘who to 
investigate.’”310 The Report concluded: “The initial reliance on a 
pretextual justification [for firing Comey] could support an inference 
that the President had concerns about providing the real reason for the 
firing, although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns 
were personal, political, or both.”311 
The Mueller Report also details the President’s extensive efforts to 
remove Mr. Mueller from his special counsel position.312 Among the 
many facts cited by the Report are the following. After learning of the 
appointment of the special counsel, the President became so upset that 
he “slumped back in his chair and said, ‘Oh my God. This is terrible. 
This is the end of my Presidency. I’m fucked.’”313 After expressing his 
anger that Sessions had recused himself, he urged Attorney General 
Sessions to resign. The Report states, “Sessions recalled that the 
President said to him, ‘you were supposed to protect me,’ or words to 
that effect.”314 The Report also recounts the President’s many efforts to 
get Mueller removed on various conflict-of-interest grounds.315 
Eventually, the President told the White House Counsel to have 
Mueller removed from office.316 The Counsel, however, did not follow 
the President’s instructions, even after receiving a follow-up call from 
the President with a second request to have Mueller fired.317 The 
Report concludes: “Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s 
attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special 
Counsel’s oversight of investigations that involved the President’s 
conduct – and, most immediately, to reports that the President was 
being investigated for potential obstruction of justice.”318 
After failing to have Mueller removed from office, the President 
made considerable efforts to curtail the Special Counsel 
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investigation.319 First, the President asked his former campaign 
manager, Corey Lewandowski, to deliver a message to Attorney 
General Sessions to limit the investigation to future election 
interference.320 Lewandowski, however, never delivered the message. 
The President later told Lewandowski “that if Sessions did not meet 
with him, Lewandowski should tell Sessions he was fired,” but again, 
the meeting never took place.321 Other efforts to limit the investigation 
included public criticism of Attorney General Sessions for not 
controlling the investigation322 and ordering his Chief of Staff to 
demand Session’s resignation.323 The Mueller Report concluded that 
“substantial evidence indicates that the President’s effort to have 
Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel’s investigation to future 
election interference was intended to prevent further investigative 
scrutiny of the President’s and his campaign’s conduct.”324 
In sum, the efforts by the President and his legal team to interfere 
with and discredit the investigations of his potential criminal activity 
make President Nixon’s efforts to derail the Watergate investigation 
look like small potatoes in comparison. The Mueller report put the 
President’s acts together this way: 
Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were 
capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement 
investigations, including the Russia-interference and obstruction 
investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-
one meetings in which the President sought to use his official power 
outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts to 
remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the 
Attorney General’s recusal; to the attempted use of official power 
to limit the scope of the investigation; to direct and indirect contacts 
with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. 
Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their 
significance. For example, the President’s direction to McGahn to 
have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost 
immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney 
General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective 
election-interference only – a temporal connection that suggests 
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that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the 
investigation.325 
The President’s efforts to influence individual cases before the 
Department of Justice did not cease with the conclusion of the Mueller 
investigation. For example, the President became publicly involved in 
the case of his friend and confidant, Roger Stone, who was convicted in 
November of 2019 of obstructing an inquiry by the House Intelligence 
Committee into Russian interference in the 2016 election, lying to 
federal investigators, and attempting to prevent the testimony of a 
witness who could disclose his false testimony.326 After President Trump 
complained on Twitter that the prosecutors’ recommended sentence of 
seven to nine years in prison was “horrible and very unfair” and went 
on to say that he “[c]annot allow this miscarriage of justice,” Attorney 
General William Barr intervened in the case and changed the 
recommendation to a more lenient sentence.327 After the Attorney 
General’s action, three of the four prosecutors who investigated and 
prosecuted the case withdrew from the case, and a fourth resigned from 
the Department altogether.328 The prosecutors’ anger was amplified by 
the fact that they were told of the reversal only after Fox News reported 
it.329 
The action created a firestorm of protest as department lawyers and 
former federal prosecutors spoke out against the reversal of the 
prosecutors’ recommendation.330 One former prosecutor stated, “in 
essence, the leadership of the Justice Department has commandeered 
the sentencing in a politically sensitive criminal matter, reversing the 
position uniformly accepted and promoted by the career 
prosecutors.”331 The New York Times reported: 
Prosecutors across the United States, who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity to avoid reprisals, said this week that they had already 
been wary of working on any case that might catch Mr. Trump’s 
attention and that the Stone episode only deepened their concern. 
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They also said that they were worried that Mr. Barr might not 
support them in politically charged cases.332 
In spite of the Justice Department’s denials that any official had 
conferred with President Trump about the case, many remained 
skeptical about the legitimacy of the process. Jack Goldsmith, who 
headed the Office of Legal Counsel under George W. Bush, 
commented: “Even assuming that Bill Barr is acting with integrity, it is 
impossible to believe that because the president is making him look 
like his political lap dog. Trump makes it impossible to have confidence 
in the department’s judgment.”333 
Given the evidence contained in the Mueller Report and the 
President’s interference in the Stone investigation, there is little doubt 
that the traditional independence of federal prosecutors is facing one 
of its most significant challenges. The current White House has ignored 
the previously well-entrenched limitations designed to prevent politics 
from influencing criminal investigations and cases. Although, at this 
point, there is not any definitive evidence that the President’s efforts 
have affected any particular investigations or prosecutions, there is 
ample reason to consider how one might reinforce these important 
protections against misuse of the federal criminal enforcement regime. 
V. POSSIBLE WAYS TO REINFORCE FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
This final section considers ways to think about how Congress or 
future administrations might respond to the challenges to federal 
prosecutorial independence. The first response is conceptual. We can 
reinforce the norm of independent prosecutorial decision making by 
placing it in the context of the separation-of-powers principles that 
mandate prosecutorial independence from the judicial and legislative 
branches and then looking for ways to reinforce this norm. The second 
response involves potential statutory or regulatory changes that would 
protect prosecutorial independence in individual cases while respecting 
the President’s constitutional power to direct the general policies and 
management of the Department of Justice. 
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A. Conceptualizing Federal Prosecutorial Independence as Part of the 
Constitutionally Mandated Separation of Powers 
By looking at the subject of federal prosecutorial independence 
from the perspective of all three branches, it is much easier to 
understand why there must be exceptionally strong separation-of-
powers policy limitations on White House involvement in individual 
cases and investigations. The strict limitations on judicial and legislative 
involvement in individual cases are not designed just to protect 
presidential prerogative; they are required in order to protect the 
integrity of the constitutional mandate that all three branches 
participate independently in the federal criminal process. The judicial 
branch may conduct the trials in individual cases, but it may not create 
or recognize common law crimes, nor may it require the executive to 
bring or try a particular case. The legislative branch may pass laws of 
general applicability, but it may take no part in directing or even 
influencing the selection of those who will be prosecuted, nor may it 
participate in the adjudicative process that determines individual guilt 
or innocence. The executive is left with the task of investigating possible 
crimes and bringing individuals to trial. 
For the executive’s separate role in individual prosecutions to be 
meaningful, however, it must be carried out in a manner that is free 
from political influence or even the appearance of political influence.334 
Just as Congress must carry out its constitutional oversight role without 
allowing it to influence open criminal investigations, the executive 
branch must carry out its prosecutorial role without White House 
involvement in individual cases. Each branch must prevent politics 
from tainting the investigative and prosecutorial process. If they 
weaken their commitment to this principle, individual liberty is 
jeopardized and the Constitution’s careful design is damaged. This is 
not merely a question of good policy; it addresses the issue of abusive 
use of presidential power in a way that threatens individual liberty and 
presidential accountability. The constitutional prohibitions on judicial 
and congressional interference explain why politically based influence 
in individual criminal prosecutions is an abuse of presidential 
prerogative. 
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The first way to reinforce this principle is for the Senate Judiciary 
Committee to demand that every Senate-confirmed nominee for 
positions in the Department of Justice agree to adhere to the principles 
most recently set forth in the Holder memorandum.335 For example, 
after the U.S. Attorney crisis forced the resignation of Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales, the Senate used the confirmation hearings 
for his successor, Michael Mukasey, to repeatedly question the nominee 
about the Justice Department’s White House Contacts policy and 
obtain a commitment to issuing detailed procedures to restrict contacts 
between the White House and the Department of Justice lawyers.336 
After his confirmation, Attorney General Mukasey fulfilled his 
commitment and issued a new memorandum restricting contacts 
between the White House and Department of Justice lawyers.337 
This should not be an ad hoc process but should become a standard 
that both parties agree, in advance of any nomination, to apply to 
nominees of both parties.338 These commitments could be monitored by 
vigorous oversight of any potential violations of the policy and 
enforced by censure votes or even, in the appropriate case, possible 
impeachment.339 The Government Accountability Office and the 
Department of Justice Inspector General could be given roles in 
monitoring compliance with the White House contacts policy.340 If the 
Judiciary Committee has the will and the institutional sense of purpose 
to enforce this policy, the public would be much more aware of its 
importance and would care about enforcement of the policy, which 
would make breaches of the policy much less likely. 
B. Possible Statutory and Regulatory Changes 
If the commitments of nominees prove to be an insufficient barrier 
to improper White House interference, Congress might consider 
statutory changes, including mandates that the Department adopt 
formal regulations to implement a White House contacts policy.341 It 
seems clear that it would not be constitutionally impermissible for 
 
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 256–64; see also Kent, supra note 1, at 1955–57.  
 336. See Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey to be Attorney General of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong., at 99–100 (2007) (questions of 
Chairman Patrick J. Leahy); id. at 147–49 (questions of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse). 
 337. See supra text accompanying notes 250–55.  
 338. If necessary, in order to avoid partisan motives, both parties could set a confirmation 
standard on this issue that would not be implemented until after the next presidential election. 
 339. Kent, supra note 1, at 1957–60. 
 340. Id. at 1960–61.  
 341. Id. at 1962–64. 
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Congress to significantly regulate White House involvement in 
individual prosecutions. As Peter Shane has recently argued, given the 
weak link between the Framers’ conception of core executive power 
and the federal prosecutorial function, there is little constitutional 
reason to limit Congress’s ability to regulate the relationship between 
the White House and federal prosecutors.342 Indeed, as Shane points 
out, 
Criminal prosecution, like environmental protection or food safety 
regulation, is an administrative function for which the executive 
branch would have no role except insofar as Congress grants such a 
role though its statutory enactments. Indeed the peripheral status of 
the prosecutor in relation to the core of executive power is 
especially clear precisely because, at the time of the Founding, 
prosecution would have been understood to have as much of a 
judicial as it does an executive character. Against the actual 
historical background of prosecution, it is entirely faithful to 
original understanding to respect Congress’s authority to determine 
the scope of presidential policy control over criminal prosecutors.343 
One additional change would be easy to implement. Congress could 
require the DOJ and White House to file a regular report of any 
contacts that were outside the scope of the White House contacts policy 
with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. In 2007, the Senate 
considered a bill titled “Security from Political Interference in Justice 
Act of 2007.”344 The bill, S. 1845, came out of a Senate hearing involving 
the testimony of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales concerning the 
greatly expanded number of White House and Department of Justice 
officials who were permitted to discuss open investigations and cases.345 
The bill would have required both the Department of Justice and the 
White House to submit semiannual reports to the Senate and House 
Committees on the Judiciary listing all “covered communications” 
between the White House and the Department of Justice, with certain 
exceptions.346 Covered communications were defined as “any 
communications relating to an on-going investigation conducted by the 
Department of Justice in any civil or criminal matter (regardless of 
whether a civil action or criminal indictment or information has been 
 
 342. Peter Shane, Prosecutors at the Periphery, 94 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 241, 241–45 
(2019). 
 343. Id. at 264. 
 344. Security from Political Interference in Justice Act of 2007, S. 1845, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 345. S. Rep. No. 110-203, at 3–6, 17–19 (2007).  
 346. Id. § (3).  
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filed).”347 They did not include “any communication relating to policy, 
appointments, legislation, rule-making, budgets, public relations, 
programmatic matters, intergovernmental relations, administrative or 
personnel matters, appellate litigation, or requests for legal advice.”348 
For the communications that originated from the Department of 
Justice, the bill exempted the communications of the Attorney General, 
the Deputy Attorney General, and the Associate Attorney General 
from being reported.349 For communications that originated from 
White House, the bill exempted the communications of the President, 
the Vice President, the Counsel to the President and the Counselor to 
the President.350 The Senate report noted, “one of the most common 
and effective tools of congressional oversight is to require the 
Executive Branch to produce reports to Congress.”351 Although the 
Judiciary Committee favorably reported the bill by a vote of 14 yeas 
and 2 nays, the full Senate took no further action on the bill.352 Congress 
should now resume consideration and pass such a bill. 
Beyond this kind of measure, Congress should tread very carefully 
lest they fall victim to the overregulation that followed the resignation 
of President Nixon. Given the egregious conduct described in the 
Mueller Report, Congress might be very tempted to impose sweeping 
limitations on the President’s authority or to resurrect some of the now-
discarded statutory reforms of the post-Watergate era. These measures 
lapsed or were repealed for good reason. In the long run, they created 
more problems than they solved. 
For example, it would be a mistake to resurrect the wisely discarded 
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. The 
hair-trigger appointments of independent counsels under the old 
statute generated overlong investigations of mostly insignificant 
subjects. The few investigations that were worthy of independent 
investigation could (and would) have been easily handled by a special 
counsel appointed by the Department of Justice like Leon Jaworski and 
Robert Mueller. Even if a renewed statute were still deemed 
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 348. Id. § (2)(1)(B).  
 349. Id. § (2)(2) 
 350. Id. § (2)(3). 
 351. S. Rep. No. 110-203, at 7 (2007).  
 352. Id. at 8. The House released its own version of the bill. See Security from Political 
Interference in Justice Act of 2007, H.R. 3848, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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constitutional,353 it would be unwise and probably not necessary to 
solve the problem of improper White House contacts.354 
There is even more reason to reject proposals that were not adopted 
after Watergate. For example, legislation to make the Department of 
Justice more independent by imposing limitations on the President’s 
power to remove senior Department of Justice officials are 
constitutionally suspect and unnecessary.355 Those proposals did not 
succeed even during the hyper-regulatory phase of the post-Nixon era, 
and they should not be resurrected now.356 The Department of Justice 
is a resilient organization with lawyers who are committed to the 
impartial enforcement of the law. Without diminishing the gross 
impropriety of the conduct documented by the Mueller Report, it is 
worth noting that there has been no evidence that the Department 
altered the investigation or prosecution of individual cases in response 
to the attempted interference by the White House. Part of the reason 
that the more radical proposals for Department of Justice 
independence have not succeeded (in addition to the significant 
constitutional problems associated with making the entire Department 
of Justice an independent agency) is the significant decentralization of 
the Department of Justice, which makes routine interference in 
prosecutorial decision-making quite difficult.357 That decentralization 
 
 353. In recent years, some scholars have been sympathetic to Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
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operates as a significant intra-branch check on regular and consistent 
instances of unwelcome political influence.358 
 CONCLUSION 
The separation of powers operates nowhere more clearly than in 
the distribution of powers over federal criminal prosecution. Each 
branch has a clearly defined role to play, and each branch is limited in 
the extent to which it participates in the determination of individual 
guilt or innocence. Congress may pass laws of general applicability. The 
executive may identify and prosecute those who violate those laws. The 
courts may determine individual guilt or innocence. Congress’s role in 
creating criminal law is consistent with its political character. The 
Constitution requires electoral accountability for the creation of our 
laws. That is why, in the federal system, the mainly unaccountable courts 
have no role in the creation of the criminal laws. On the other hand, we 
want the courts that determine individual guilt or innocence to operate 
independently so that the application of the criminal law is not tainted 
by political influence. The executive’s role involves both general and 
individual decision-making. With respect to general prosecutorial 
policy, it is appropriate for the politically accountable White House to 
direct the actions of the Department of Justice. With respect to 
individual cases, however, the involvement of the White House is just 
as suspect as the involvement of Congress. It is up to Congress to make 
certain that this important intra-branch separation-of-powers norm is 
respected at the Department of Justice. 
 
 
 358. Arffa, supra note 357, at 1115.  
